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INTRODUCTION
There is an old Chinese curse that goes, “May you live in inter-
esting times.”  For observers of land use in Oregon, that curse is a
present reality.  As the struggle between property-rights advo-
cates and land-use laws heats up around the nation, Oregon finds
itself boiling over.1  For years, people have looked to Oregon for
an example of a successful statewide land-use plan.  More re-
cently, property-rights advocates from around the nation have
looked to Oregon for an example of how to defeat so-called
smart-growth and land-use laws.  In the past five years, millions
of dollars have been spent fighting over property rights in Ore-
gon.2  Since 2000, property-rights advocates have succeeded in
passing two statewide ballot initiatives, although they have had
1 Oregon editors and broadcasters voted the Measure 37 controversy as Oregon’s
top story for 2005 topping even the methamphetamine crisis. Joseph B. Frazier, As-
sociated Press, Land Use Ranked as State’s Top Story for 2005 , NEWS-REGISTER
(McMinnville, Or.), Dec. 31, 2005, available at  http://www.newsregister.com/news/
results.cfm?story_no=202535.
2 See  Follow the Money: The Institute on Money in State Politics, http://www.
followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?si=200437&m=222 (last vis-
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mixed success in the courts.  Both measures, discussed more
thoroughly below, were designed to compensate property owners
for partial regulatory takings.  The first statute (Measure 7) was
held unconstitutional by the Oregon Supreme Court,3 but the
court recently upheld the second (Measure 37), overturning a
controversial lower-court decision.4  A host of outstanding issues
ensures that the legal wrangling over Measure 37 will not be over
for some time.5  Meanwhile, both sides are gearing up with more
ballot initiatives for the 2006 election.6
ited Mar. 27, 2006) (showing that over $4.2 million was contributed to Measure 37
campaign committees).
3 League of OREGon Cities v. State, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002).  The basis for
the decision was the measure’s violation of the Armatta  principle, a state doctrine
forbidding the creation of multiple, closely related constitutional changes by passage
of a single measure. Id. at 334 Or. at 667, 56 P.3d at 906. This “separate vote” princi-
ple was enunciated in Armatta v. Kitzhaber , 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998).
4 See infra  Part II.B (discussing Measure 37 and MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin.
Serv., 340 Or. 117 (2006)).
5 Laura Oppenheimer, Court Upholds Measure 37 , OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb.
21, 2006, at A1.
6 The land-use battles have spawned a dizzying array of initiatives for the 2006
election season.  Property-rights lobbying group Oregonians In Action (OIA) has
contributed two Measure 37 revisions (Initiatives 54 and 55) and two other such
revisions (Initiatives 63 and 64) that incorporate anti-Kelo  provisions. See Oregon
Sec’y of State, Election Div., http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/other.info/irr.htm
(search 2006 Initiative proposals in the “Initiative Referendum and Referral Log”)
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006); see also infra  Part I.B for a discussion of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London , 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (up-
holding a municipality’s use of eminent domain to condemn private property for
transfer to another private owner in the name of economic development). OIA and
Bill Sizemore, Executive Director of the politically conservative Oregon Taxpayers
United, have also contributed a handful of solely anti-Kelo  initiatives (Initiatives 25,
49, and 56-62) with increasingly hostile names, culminating in the “Government
Can’t Steal My Property and Give it to a Developer Act.” See Oregon Sec’y of
State, Election Div., supra .  Anti-Measure 37 initiatives are also in evidence, and
these measures most clearly illustrate the strange bedfellows created by Oregon’s
current land-use climate.  1000 Friends of Oregon, a non-profit charitable organiza-
tion dedicated to a strong land-use regulatory regime, is supporting Initiative 80,
which restricts the ability of governments to issue Measure 37 waivers or compensa-
tion remedies, but also grants homestead rights to those who would have been al-
lowed to build a single home at the time of property acquisition. See 1000 Friends of
Oregon, Home Owner & Family Farmer’s Bill of Rights, http://www.friends.org/is-
sues/bill-of-rights/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).  1000 Friends also supports
Initiative 81, which places them with one foot in each camp: anti-Measure 37 and
anti-Kelo . See id .  1000 Friends Legislative Affairs Director Elon Hasson is chief
petitioner on three other initiatives: Initiative 140 (supplementing Initiative 81 with
a conservation-easement compensation element); Initiative 141 (an anti-Kelo  initia-
tive allowing compensation for conservation easements) and initiative 142 (provid-
ing special tax consideration and easement compensation for conservation
easements).  Oregon Sec’y of State, Election Div., supra.
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Observers of the land-use debate may be better served using
Oregon as an example of what not to do.  For all of the recent
efforts in this debate, and for all of the money spent on signature
gatherers, advertisements, and legal fees, what have Oregonians
received?  Mostly, a lot of confusion, disenfranchised voters,
public mistrust of the judiciary,7 and the appearance that the Or-
egon Legislature is unable or unwilling to come to a reasonable
compromise on issues that matter to Oregonians.8  Perhaps it is
7 Measure 37 suffers from several drafting and conceptual issues that left officials
responsible for administering it unclear about the proper means to do so.  The con-
tention over these issues led to several lawsuits, including one by Crook County,
which brought suit to determine the legality of its own Measure 37 waiver-remedy
implementation.  James Sinks, Counties Find Various Ways to Cope With Measure
37: Officials Say the Mandate Is Unclear , BEND BULLETIN, Feb. 8, 2005, at C1  (re-
ferring to Crook County v. Crook County, Civil No. 05-CV0015 (Cir. Ct. Crook
County, Or., filed Feb. 3, 2005)).
When a lower Oregon court found Measure 37 unconstitutional, see infra Part
II.B, the already swampy ground of land-use law in Oregon became a pit of quick-
sand.  The decision “created more confusion around a law that already has per-
plexed officials, who are unsure of how to enforce it.” Charles Beggs, Associated
Press, Judge Overturns Property Rights Law , REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Oct.
15, 2005, http://www.registerguard.com/news/2005/10/15/a1.measure37.1015.p1.php?
section=cityregion (last visited Mar.27, 2006).  Voters who had approved of Measure
37 felt that the decision was reflective of a larger problem with judicial activism:
“This is telling everybody our vote doesn’t mean squat.  We need new judges.”
Laura Oppenheimer, Judge Razes Measure 37 Land Law , OREGONIAN (Portland),
Oct. 15, 2005, at A1.  Some even responded to the perception that the decision ig-
nored the will of the voters by issuing a recall petition for Judge Mary Mertens
James, discussed infra .  Neither the bulk of the recall discussion, nor the petition
itself, seemed to focus on the basic issue of whether Judge James had followed the
law or the Oregon and Federal Constitutions, but instead focused on the fact that
Measure 37 was a voter-passed initiative. See  Petition for the Recall of Judge Mary
James, http://www.recalljudgejames.com/downloads/Petition.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2006). Ironically, the group leading the recall effort calls itself the Constitution
Party.  In any event, to the shock of many property-rights advocates, the Oregon
Supreme Court ultimately came down on their side by overruling Judge James’s de-
cision.  Brad Cain, Associated Press, Supreme Court Upholds Property Rights Law ,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/
texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=weboregon21&date=20060221&query=supreme+
court+upholds+property+rights+law (last visited Apr.18, 2006).
8 The Legislature began its session one month after Measure 37 became effective.
Despite efforts on all sides to clarify and correct provisions of the new law, the
session ended with no solutions in sight.  When asked to hold a special session,
[t]he governor and the state’s top lawmakers all said convening would be
unproductive, after months of wrangling over land-use this year dis-
integrated.  Oregon Senate President Peter Courtney, D-Salem . . . said a
legislative session was unlikely to get anywhere.  A spokesman for House
Speaker Karen Minnis, R-Wood Village, said it was hard to imagine
lawmakers’ [sic] supporting another round of land-use debate now.
Oppenheimer, supra  note 7.
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the burden of Oregon’s informal national leadership in the land-
use arena that makes compromise so difficult.
This Article suggests that the parties in the property-rights de-
bate look to the example set in other states and seek reasonable
compromise.  In short, this Article argues that Transferable De-
velopment Rights9 (TDRs) may hold an answer for Oregon.
TDRs help preserve both property rights and zoning schemes by
allowing landowners to transfer development rights from re-
stricted “sending sites” to “receiving sites” better able to accom-
modate the added density.10  As such, they offer a solution that
would preserve the land-use system that has made the balance
between Oregon’s urban areas and countryside the envy of the
nation, while compensating landowners whose property values
may have declined due to those very same land-use laws.  How-
ever, this compensation, rather than coming from local govern-
ments at the expense of other services, would instead be paid by
those interested in purchasing TDRs for further development of
other properties.
In order to properly address the land-use debate in Oregon,
this Article first provides, in Parts I and II, some background on
how Oregon has arrived at this point.  The remainder of the Arti-
cle focuses on TDRs: Part III explains how TDR programs work
and discusses their advantages.  Parts IV and V discuss some
challenges that would accompany implementation of a major
TDR program in Oregon, both in terms of potential legal pitfalls
and possible implementation schemes.
I
REGULATORY TAKINGS, LAND-USE LAW,
AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
To some, it may seem that property-rights advocates in Oregon
are striking a chord that has been out of tune ever since land-use
9 For more background information on transfer development rights, see generally
Dorothy J. Glancy, Preserving Rockefeller Center , 24 URB. LAW. 423 (1992) (TDRs
and architectural preservation); Michael D. Strugar, Transferable Development
Rights: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul? , 62 U. DET. L. REV. 633 (1985); James T.B. Tripp
& Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable
Rights Programs , 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989).
10 See  Keith Aoki, All the King’s Horses and All the Kings Men: Putting the Frag-
mented Metropolis Back Together Again? Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland
Metro, and Oregon’s Measure 37 , 21 J.L. & POL. 397, 442-43 (2005).
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regulations became an accepted part of local government.11  Be-
cause property rights in the United States are such a substantial
source of contention, it is unsurprising that the relatively rapid,
substantial, and continuing changes in legal definitions of prop-
erty rights over the last century have created upheaval and
discontent.12
Property-rights advocates make the relatively simple argument
that when property is purchased, the owner is entitled to rely on
the regulations present at the time of acquisition.13  The theory
represents a “you get what you pay for” principle that appeals to
common sense, and speaks to values that are respected in most
fields of law: predictability, fairness, and protection of people’s
reliance interests.  Furthermore, property-rights advocates make
the traditional argument that the Federal Constitution’s takings
provision draws a line between regulations that prevent public
harm and those that create a public benefit.14  They argue that
regulations preventing public harms fall within the category of
laws the State is authorized to pass under its plenary power to
govern.15  By contrast, laws passed to confer a public benefit at
the expense of an individual property owner may fall within the
“public use” power of eminent domain, and thus require just
11 See generally  J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine , 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 89 (1995) (presenting several arguments
against land-use regulations).
12 See generally  Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property , 83 IOWA L. REV. 277
(1998).
13 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (stating that “All  regulations, all  taxes, and all  modifi-
cations of liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by
the state); see also BILL MOSHOFSKY, REGULATORY OVERKILL: IT’S TIME TO RE-
FORM LAND USE REGULATION: TAKING AWAY THE USE OF PRIVATE LAND TO PRO-
VIDE PUBLIC BENEFITS WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT—THAT’S GRAND LARCENY AND
PETTY THEFT 25-35 (2004) (discussing the importance of individual property rights).
See generally  Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What’s Wrong
With Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277 (1996) (discussing an alternative to zoning
and comprehensive plans).
14 Bill Moshofsky, The Public Should Weigh Cost vs. Benefit , LOOKING FOR-
WARD, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 10, available at  http://oia.org/LookingForwardSept-
Oct2005.pdf.  For an early judicial opinion expressing this line, see Miller v. Schoene ,
276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
15 Moshofsky, supra  note 14, at 10; Cf ., Miller , 276 U.S. at 272 (State destroyed
cedar trees to stop the spread of disease to adjoining apple orchards.  This was not
considered a taking because the State was acting under its police power to prevent
harm).
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compensation for the property owner under the Federal
Constitution.16
A. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon
However, there are different and contrary strands of takings
jurisprudence that exhibit a similar common-sense appeal.  In the
landmark case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon , Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes noted the “long recognized” principle that property
rights “are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power” because “[g]overnment hardly could go on” if
every diminishment of property values must be compensated.17
Property owners have no unqualified right to rely on the land-use
regulations in effect when they purchased their property, since
they buy with presumed knowledge of the changeability of land-
use regulations and profit from the reciprocal advantage to their
property created by the government’s regulation of others.18
Holmes went on, however, to acknowledge regulatory takings
for the first time, noting that “obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are
gone.”19  The Court held that by making it commercially imprac-
tical to mine coal (the rights to which previously had been se-
cured by contract) the law had the effect of destroying the
property.20  This was a marked departure from the Court’s previ-
ous stance that only a physical taking, depriving the owner of
possession, could be considered a taking.21  Infamously, Justice
Holmes left future generations to determine at what point a per-
missible regulation goes “too far” and thereby becomes a
taking.22
B. Kelo and the Search for Common Ground
The search for the “too far” point has created a no man’s land
over which property-rights advocates and advocates of land-use
16 Moshofsky, supra  note 14, at 10.
17 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
18 Id . at 415.
19 Id . at 413.
20 Id . at 414.
21 See , e.g. , Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (regulation not a
taking, even though all economic value of the property had been lost); Mugler v.
Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (regulation prohibiting brewing was not a taking,
even though the building in question was a brewery and had little value for any
other purpose, and brewing was lawful at the time of purchase).
22 Pennsylvania Coal , 260 U.S. at 415.
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regulation have battled continuously in the eight decades follow-
ing Pennsylvania Coal.  The battle has been fought along two
main axes: (1) the extent of deprivation caused by the regula-
tion,23 and (2) the nature of the public interest served by the reg-
ulation.24  Although the Supreme Court continues to address
these issues, the major decisions after Pennsylvania Coal  have
23 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), established a
temporary line in the sand regarding the permissible extent of regulatory depriva-
tion, with a bright-line holding that “too far” definitely includes regulations that
remove all beneficial economic use of the land.  Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity in Lucas , placed deprivation of all economically viable use of a property among
those “categorical” situations (along with physical invasion) that constitute a para-
digmatic taking. Id . at 1029-30. Justice Scalia then went on to say that deprivations
of less than 100% also may be takings, subject to the ad hoc evaluations formulated
in the 1978 Penn Central  decision. Id . at 1015 (citing Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).  As Justice Scalia acknowledged, no
one can say what logic precludes a taking at 95% loss, or 75%, or 50%, id . at 1019
n.8, so the line in the sand may move with the future tide of judicial decision or
legislative action—including ballot initiatives. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty ,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), perhaps the most famous case to uphold the validity of zoning
regulations, allowed a 75% diminution of property value without finding a taking.
24 Early cases attempted to draw the line between regulations aimed at preventing
public harm and those aimed at public benefit. See  Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,
279 (1928) (law requiring destruction of cedar trees infected with cedar rust to pre-
vent contamination of apple orchards was justified because the value to the State of
the produce outweighed the interests of the cedar owners);  Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (regulation conferring public benefit is not
exercise of police power, but exercise of eminent domain;  preservation of land’s
rural character upheld as a valid avoidance of public harm).  Regulation of property
to prevent public harm was considered a legitimate use of plenary power to abate
nuisances. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-593 (1962); Mugler ,
123 U.S. at 668-69.  Regulation to create public benefit, however, was considered a
kind of unjust enrichment of the public at the expense of the unfortunate property
owner. Just, 201 N.W. 2d at 767.  These cases exemplify a version of the principle
asserted by property-rights groups such as OIA when they argue that regulations for
health and safety (e.g., anti-pollution laws) may be permissible without compensa-
tion, but regulations granting public “benefits” (e.g., preservation of wildlife habitat)
are takings.
Modern land-use cases, such as Penn Central  and Lucas , generally have not em-
braced this traditional standard, in part because of the obviously subjective nature of
attempts to distinguish harm prevention from benefit conference. As Justice Scalia
wrote in Lucas ,
[T]he distinction between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that
which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an ob-
jective, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic can-
not serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory “takings”—which
require compensation—from regulatory deprivations that do not require
compensation. A fortiori  the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justifi-
cation cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total
regulatory takings must be compensated.
505 U.S. at 1026.
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created no principles that definitively end the debate.  This un-
certainty fuels hostility as each side vigorously defends its own
vision of property rights and the public interest, accusing the
other side of unprincipled, self-seeking motives.25
The controversy over the Supreme Court’s 2005 Kelo v. City of
New London26 decision illustrates the continuing relevancy of
conflicts over the proper type of interest served by government
action regarding property. Kelo  arose when a city used its emi-
nent-domain power to condemn several properties for an eco-
nomic-development project.27  The project could not be properly
characterized as an elimination of public harm because the con-
demned area was not blighted; instead, it was chosen merely for
the practical benefits of using those properties for the project.28
The Court characterized the condemnation as a valid use of emi-
nent domain, reasoning that the taking was accomplished for a
public purpose (which it found equivalent to “public use”).29  Al-
though the Court did not base its holding on the benefit/harm
dichotomy, it dedicated a substantial part of its opinion to show-
ing that the Kelo  case was indistinguishable from earlier deci-
sions in which blighted areas were condemned on harm-removal
grounds.30
Although Kelo largely reconfirmed principles enunciated in
prior decisions,31 a combination of factors in the case (such as
25 For example, during the ascendancy of Measure 37, land-use regulation advo-
cates charged that Measure 37’s backers were largely timber and development inter-
ests and that campaign exhibits of little old ladies who just want a house on their
land were only attempts to conceal the real beneficiaries of the ballot measure. See
Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon , WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2005, at A1; see also  Election Div., Oregon Sec’y of State, Voters’ Pamphlet:
Volume 1-State Measures 119-32 (2004) available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elec-
tions/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvol1.pdf. At the same time, Measure 37 advocates claim
that Judge James, the lower-court judge who found Measure 37 invalid, had her
decision made before the case was even presented and ignored the will of the voters.
They have filed a petition to recall her from office. Petition for the Recall of Judge
Mary James, supra  note 7. See also  Crystal Bolner and Peter Wong, Recall Targets
Judge in Measure 37 Case , STATESMAN J., Oct. 27, 2005, available at  http://159.54.
226.83/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051027/STATE/510270368/1042.
26 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
27 Id.  at 2658-59.
28 Id.  at 2660.
29 Id. at 2665.  The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of property for public
use without just compensation, and that prohibition is applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id . at 2658 n.1.
30 Id . at 2663-66.
31 “Public use” is inclusive of “public purpose.” See  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984). See also  Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
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sympathetic middle-class plaintiffs in respectable Victorian
homes and the press’s strong implication that big business was
unfairly profiting off the little guy—or rather, gal) have ignited
an op-ed firestorm across the nation.32  Those who in the past
had been concerned about the government’s ability to condemn
private homes for economic improvement are now livid at the
thought of their property being condemned for transfer to an-
other private party.  Justice O’Connor expressed just such a sen-
timent in her dissent:
Under the banner of economic development, all private prop-
erty is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to an-
other private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e. ,
given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature
deems more beneficial to the public—in the process.33
To guard against Kelo -type actions, activist groups across the
country have been drafting legislative and initiative measures ex-
tending state property-protections beyond the federal protec-
tions that the Supreme Court has found in the Federal
Constitution.34  The national outrage over Kelo  has been fueled
by continuing uncertainty and confusion over the basic principles
243-244 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954).  Economic develop-
ment is a public purpose. See Berman , 348 U.S. at 33-34 (authorizing exercise of
eminent domain where development will serve public goal of preventing urban
blight).  A taking for the purpose of transfer to a private party is permissible. Id.;
Hawaii Hous. Auth. , 467 U.S. at 243-44 (permitting transfer of condemned property
to private parties).
32 Kenneth R. Harney, Court Ruling Leaves Poor at Greatest Risk , WASH. POST,
July 2, 2005, at F1;  Bill Mears, Supreme Court Backs Municipal Land Grabs ,  June
24, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/scotus.property/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2006).  The decision generated congressional interest in addition to public contro-
versy: the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee convened hearings the following Sep-
tember entitled “The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and other
Private Property.” The  Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other
Private Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 109th Cong. (2005),
available at  http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1612.
33 Kelo , 125 S. Ct. at 2671.
34 For a catalogue of state legislative efforts, see Wyoming Legislative Serv. Of-
fice, Recent State Legislative Reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Kelo
v. New London (2005),  http://legisweb.state.wy.us/PubResearch/2005/05FS021.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006). Federal efforts include passage in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives of H.R.4128, which would revoke two years of federal economic-devel-
opment funding from any state or political subdivision that uses its eminent domain
power for economic development. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).  The House
also passed House Resolution 340, which expressed disapproval of the Kelo  deci-
sion, specifically the use of eminent domain to “advantage one private party over
another.” H.R. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
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of regulatory and takings law discussed above.  Until land-use ju-
risprudence provides a principled limit on the government’s
power to invade property rights, land-use regulations will con-
tinue to be viewed with deep suspicion by property-rights advo-
cates as arbitrary and unprincipled burdens.
II
ASCENDANCY OF THE PROPERTY-RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN OREGON:  MEASURE 7 AND THE
MEASURE 37 PHOENIX
A. Measure 7 (2000)
Since the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 10035 in 1973,
Oregon has been a leader in land-use planning.36  Oregon’s com-
prehensive planning has helped slow urban sprawl and preserve
rural resources.37 In fact, business and civic groups from across
the globe tour Oregon’s compact cities and pastoral countryside
envisioning how they might replicate it “back home.”38  More re-
cently, however, Oregon has become known as the leading
model for how to defeat land-use regulation.39  With the passage
of Measure 37, property-rights advocates from around the coun-
35 S.B. 100, 57th Or. Legis. Ass’y (1973).  The bill is codified at Chapter 197 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes Comprehensive Land Use Planning Coordination.  For a
brief overview of the effects of Senate Bill 100, see  Aoki, supra  note 10, at 426-27
and  Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the Reviewer: The Impact of the Land-Use Board
of Appeals on the Oregon Land-Use Program, 1979-1999 , 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
441, 456-59 (2000).
36 The Greens Bite Back: Land Wars in the West, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005,
at 35; Dwight H. Merriam, Breaking Big Boxes: Learning From the Horse Whisper-
ers , ALI-ABA Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Do-
main, and Compensation 2029, 2036 (Aug. 25-27, 2005).
37 Edward S. Sullivan, et al., The Oregon Example: A Prospect for the Nation , 14
ENVTL. L. 843 (1984); Editorial, Oregon’s Property Rights Revolt , CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Boston), Dec. 6, 2004, at 8.
38 Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Proclaims: Subdivide and Conquer , OREGO-
NIAN (Portland), June 12, 2005, at A1; See also  Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the
Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation , 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187 (1997);
Sara C. Galvan, Gone Too Far: Oregon’s Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-Regulat-
ing Land Use , 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 587 (2005); George Charles Homsey, The
Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving ‘Partial Takings’ From Political Theory to
Legal Reality , 37 URB. LAW. 269 (2005); Nancy G. Marguiles, State Private Property
Rights Initiatives as a Response to “Environmental Takings”,  46 S.C. L. REV. 613
(1995).
39 Oppenheimer, supra  note 37; see also  Daniel Brook, How the West Was Lost ,
LEGAL AFFAIRS,  Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 44 (describing campaign strategy of Measure
37 advocates).
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try have been looking to Oregon for direction in passing compen-
sation statutes in their own states.40  As a result, Oregon
property-rights activists David Hunnicutt, Bill Moshofsky, and
Ross Day have been criss-crossing the country like rock stars,41
becoming “the Madonnas and Oprahs of property rights.”42  Jet-
setting across the country and drawing comparisons to pop-cul-
ture icons mark a meteoric rise to fame for these “down-home
property-rights zealots” that few people had heard of just a few
years ago.43
Ever since the 1973 passage of Senate Bill 100, there has been
opposition to Oregon’s comprehensive land-use system.  How-
ever, legitimate challenges to it have been uncommon (albeit no-
table).44  Most believed the system was untouchable.  Some even
felt that the “vision of protecting farmlands, creating open spaces
and planning livable, walkable cities . . . has defined Oregon
more than the rain.”45
Then there was the 2000 election.  While voters focused on
anti-tax, anti-teacher, and anti-union initiatives, Oregonians In
Action (OIA), a property-rights advocacy group, sponsored
Measure 7, which crept in under most people’s radar.46  In the
early 1990s, OIA was largely dismissed as a minor statewide
player.47  At the time, OIA had been around for about ten years,
primarily representing landowners who had been denied the
right to develop their property—most notably and successfully in
40 Oppenheimer, supra  note 37; Charles Delafuente, ‘People’s Law’ Can’t Limit
Legislature, Judge Says: Oregon’s Referendum-Created Property Rights Statute Is
Overturned , A.B.A. J. E-Report Nov. 4, 2005, at 5.
41 Oppenheimer, supra  note 37.
42 Id.
43 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise? , 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158,
173 (2001); Patty Wentz, This Land Is Their Land , WILLAMETTE WEEK (Portland,
Or.), Nov. 28, 2000 at 21.
44 Perhaps the most famous case is Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
In Dolan , the Court required the local government to make some effort to quantify
a finding that a dedication for a bike path would ease traffic in proportion to the
traffic congestion caused by the plaintiff’s commercial development. Id.  at 395-96.
The Court held that a dedication of property must be roughly proportional to the
impact that the government seeks to mitigate. Id. at 391.
45 Wentz, supra  note 43.
46 Id. ; Peter Livingston, Oregon’s Land Use Wars: Measure 7 and Property Rights:
Pretty Simple? Pretty Fair? , OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN, June 2001, available at
http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/01june/landuse.htm.
47 Wentz, supra  note 43; more information about OIA is available at the organiza-
tion’s website, http://www.oia.org/.
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the Dolan v. City of Tigard case.48  However, OIA was slowly
building influence at the state level.49  In 1995, the group sup-
ported a regulatory-takings law that was vetoed by the Gover-
nor.50  In 1998, OIA sponsored and successfully passed Ballot
Measure 56, which requires the government to notify landowners
if it makes any change that lowers their property values.51  In
1999, the group helped author and pass thirteen bills, most of
which were procedural tweaks in the administration of the De-
partment of Land Conservation and Development.52
Meanwhile, two of Bill Sizemore’s53 longtime foot soldiers54
were busy drafting Measure 7, which made the signature-gather-
ing rounds with other petitions initiated by Sizemore’s Oregon
Taxpayers United (OTU), a politically conservative taxpayer ad-
vocacy group.  Upon hearing about the property-compensation
measure, OIA members felt like someone was stepping on their
turf and, “after some behind-the-scenes grappling between OTU
and OIA, Sizemore handed the measure over once he had col-
lected most of the signatures.”55  The rest is Oregon land-use
history.
48 Wentz, supra  note 43; see also supra  note 44 (discussing Dolan v. City of
Tigard).
49 Wentz, supra  note 43.
50 Id .  Senate Bill 600 was a compensation amendment and precursor to Measures
7 and 37.  Although it passed the Oregon House and Senate, it was vetoed by Gov-
ernor John Kitzhaber.
51 Wentz, supra note 43; see also BILL BRADBURY, OREGON BLUE BOOK 2005-
2006, at 300 (2005).
52 Wentz, supra  note 43; Dave Hogan, Land-Use Wins Buoy Oregonians In Ac-
tion , OREGONIAN (Portland), Dec. 25, 2000 at A1; Carl Abbott et al., A Quiet Coun-
terrevolution in Land Use Regulation: The Origins and Impact of Oregon’s Measure
7 , 14(3) HOUS. AND POL. DEBATE, 383, 396  (2003).
53 Bill Sizemore, a former Bible teacher, gubernatorial candidate and business-
man, was the king of direct democracy in Oregon.  He led his group, Oregon Tax-
payers United (OTU), in placing anti-tax and anti-labor initiatives on the ballot
nearly every year.  His power stemmed from OTU’s ability to get issues on the bal-
lot.  However, even when Sizemore’s initiatives failed, he fulfilled his objective by
distracting unions from pushing their own initiatives. Cody Hoesly, Reforming Di-
rect Democracy: Lessons from Oregon , 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1206 (2005). Despite
having been convicted of racketeering, Sizemore is still active in Oregon’s ballot-
initiative process with fifteen proposed measures for the upcoming initiative season.
Associated Press, Lots of Initiative, Not so Many Initiatives , Jan. 8, 2006 (on file with
author).
54 Wentz, supra  note 43. “Measure 7 is the creation of Becky and Stuart Miller,
who have been longtime foot soldiers for Bill Sizemore. The two of them penned
Measure 7 after an environmental overlay was placed on their land near Fanno
Creek.” Id .
55 Id. ; see also supra  note 52.
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Measure 7 would have given property owners whose property
values had been decreased due to land-use restrictions either a
right to compensation for the full amount of decreased value, or
a “waiver” of the pertinent regulations by the relevant local gov-
ernment.56  Because neither the State, nor most local govern-
ments, have surplus funds from which to pay compensation, the
measure effectively granted many landowners a virtual individual
veto power over any land-use regulations that affected their
property values and were passed after they acquired their prop-
erty.  The possible consequences of such a veto power to compre-
hensive land-use regulation are immense.
When Measure 7 passed in November 2000,57 some commenta-
tors thought it was “possibly the most important new state mea-
sure protecting private property rights.”58  Others viewed
Measure 7 as the equivalent of “dropping an atomic bomb” on
Oregon’s statewide planning system.59  Those who have followed
the property-rights debate in Oregon know that neither predic-
tion came true.  Instead, Measure 7 was ruled unconstitutional by
the Oregon Courts.60  Ruling unanimously, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that, because the measure exempted regulations
prohibiting certain activities (such as selling pornography and
nude dancing) from its compensation requirement, the measure
affected both free-speech and property rights, thus violating the
Armatta  doctrine precluding multiple-subject constitutional
amendments.61
56 Measure 7 (2000), available at  http://www.oia.org/m7-text.htm. The waiver pro-
vision of the measure allows the government to “modify, remove, or not apply” the
problematic regulations in lieu of compensation. Id.
57 Measure 7 garnered 53% approval. Election Results: Measures, available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/special/politics/mea-
sure_results2.frame (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); see also  Patricia E. Salkin, The
Smart Growth Agenda: A Snapshot of State Activity at the Turn of the Century , 21 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 271, 304 (2002).
58 404 STEVEN J. EAGLE, THE BIRTH OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 28
(2001), available at  http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1263.
59 James Sinks, Oregon Voters Put Down Tax Revolt, BEND BULLETIN (Bend,
Or.), Nov. 8, 2000, available at  http://www.bendbulletin.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20001108/VOTE01/11080709&SearchID=73240352612044.
60 League of Oregon Cities v. State, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002), discussed
supra  note 3.
61 334 Or. at 676, 56 P.3d at 911 (citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 284-85,
959 P.2d 49, 67-68 (1998)); Peter Wong, High Court Throws Out Measure On Land
Rights , STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Oct. 5, 2002 at A1; Associated Press, Oregon
High Court Overturns Property Compensation Measure,  OLYMPIAN (Olympia,
Wash.), Oct. 5, 2002 at C2.
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Following the ruling, both sides issued sound bites.  A spokes-
man for Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber said, “While there’s a
need to address the issue of legitimate private property rights
versus regulation, [Measure 7] was never the answer. . . .  It was a
blank check that would have cost Oregonians millions or billions
of dollars, while schools and other programs are inadequately
funded.”62
Measure 7 proponents were less cordial.  OIA co-director and
spokesman David Hunnicutt said, “Once again the Supreme
Court has spit in the face of Oregon voters. . . .  It’s ironic that
the reason the court invalidated the measure is because it didn’t
go far enough” in providing compensation to “porno store own-
ers.”63  Hunnicutt vowed that OIA would either ask the 2003
Legislature to send voters a revised measure or work to put a
new measure on the November 2004 ballot by initiative
petition.64
By contrast, after the demise of Measure 7, opponents of the
initiative appeared to forget about compensation statutes and
property rights.  Those who thought Measure 7 would not pass
were sure any such future measure, robbed of the advantage of
flying under the public radar, would surely fail.  This unwilling-
ness to address property-rights concerns was rebuked by some:
If we don’t listen to that voice of frustration out there, I think
we’re going to lose it all.  This is just the first salvo, and if we
don’t listen, groups like OIA will be more successful and we
could see cracks in Oregon’s land-use law that could become
fissures.65
B. Measure 37 (2004) and MacPherson v. Department of
Administrative Services (2006)
As foreseen by these critics, from the ashes of a court-rejected
Measure 7 arose the Measure 37 phoenix, just as OIA’s David
Hunnicutt had promised.  Measure 37 shares most of the same
provisions as Measure 7 but was passed as a statutory enactment
instead of a constitutional amendment.66  In a de´ja` vu of sorts,
62 Associated Press, supra  note 61.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Wentz, supra  note 43.
66 Compare Measure 7 (2000), available at  http://www.oia.org/m7-text.htm with
Measure 37 (2005), available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ guide/
meas/m37_text.html.
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Measure 37 was also challenged in the courts.67  On October 14,
2004, Marion County Circuit Judge Mary Mertens James ruled
that Measure 37 was unconstitutional under both the U.S. and
Oregon Constitutions.68  The ruling was broad and sweeping
and—had it withstood review by the Oregon Supreme Court69—
it would have erected formidable legal and practical barriers for
property-rights advocates.70
The lower-court decision struck down Measure 37 on three pri-
mary grounds: First, the measure improperly suspended Oregon
laws and abrogated the Oregon Legislature’s plenary power to
regulate for the public welfare.71  Second, it irrationally favored a
class of citizens in violation of the Oregon Constitution’s privi-
leges and immunities clause.72  And third, it violated the U.S.
67 One major suit was filed by several plaintiffs including 1000 Friends of Oregon,
a watchdog group, challenging the constitutionality of the measure on fourteen dif-
ferent state and federal grounds.  Before the decision in this suit was overruled by
the Oregon Supreme Court, the plaintiffs had prevailed on summary judgment.
MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv. Civil No. 05-C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion County,
Or., Oct. 14, 2005), available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure
37_000.pdf, overruled by  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., Civil No. S52875
(Or., filed Feb. 21, 2006) available at http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.
htm.
68 See MacPherson , Civil No. 05-C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or., Oct. 14,
2005), available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37_000.pdf.
69 See MacPherson , Civil No. S52875 (Or., filed Feb. 21, 2006), available at  http://
www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm. (striking down the lower-court deci-
sion and upholding measure 37).
70 Oppenheimer, supra  note 7.
71 MacPherson , Civil No. 05-C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or., Oct. 14, 2005),
available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37_000.pdf. The
court found that the law forbids the enforcement against some parties of regulations
passed for public welfare or requires payment to those private parties for their com-
pliance with the regulations. Id.  The court noted that government may not pay pri-
vate parties to comply with validly passed land-use laws because, if this were
permissible, the government could be required to reimburse citizens for the costs of
complying with any kind of law, “thus rendering the legislative body impotent to
regulate for the public good.” Id.
72 Id .  Article I, Section 20, of the Oregon Constitution provides: “No law shall be
passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” OR. CONST. art. I,
§ 20. First, the court identified a distinction between two separate classes of citizens,
finding that property owners who obtain their land prior to the enactment of land-
use regulations (pre-owners) are treated differently under Measure 37 than those
who acquire their property after the enactment of land-use regulations (post-own-
ers) because only pre-owners are eligible for claimant status. MacPherson , Civil No.
05-C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or., Oct. 14, 2005), available at  http://
www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37_000.pdf. Applying rational basis re-
view, the court next weighed the legitimacy of the state interest involved.  The court
held that, because Measure 37’s purpose is to compensate property owners for the
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Constitution’s guarantees of procedural and substantive due pro-
cess because it (1) lacked protections for neighbors of Measure
37 claimants (who could suffer harm from waivers of land-use
regulations), and (2) contained a classification scheme that did
not pass “rational basis” review.73  The court also upheld several
of the plaintiffs’ other claims on secondary grounds.74
It seemed impossible that the Measure 37 debate could get
more controversial, but Judge James’s decision did just that, not
only with respect to the legal framing of the issue, but also in
terms of the aftermath of the decision.  On the day the decision
came down, OIA’s David Hunnicutt stated, “[t]his is the height
of judicial activism.”75  Hunnicutt is not the only one who felt
that way.  Since James’s decision, “angry Oregonians have rallied
to yank her from the bench, have assailed her at parties and
have, on at least one occasion, announced that they’d rather
shoot her than recall her.”76  A recall petition filed against James
states, “By overruling Measure 37, Judge Mary James has disre-
garded the express will of the people of Oregon.  Judge Mary
James has undercut the fundamental, God-given right of
Oregonians to truly own their property.”77  Meanwhile, buoyed
costs of complying with validly enacted regulations (an unconstitutional goal), the
purpose does not serve a legitimate state interest. Id .  The court noted that, even if
the measure’s purpose were legitimate, its provisions are not rationally related to its
purpose because the law’s just-compensation calculation yields a windfall for those
claimants who actually benefit  from land-use regulations through their application to
surrounding properties. Id .
73 Id .  The court held that, because state law does not provide interested persons
who are not claimants a pre-deprivation notice and opportunity to be heard, the
measure violates the procedural due-process rights of those parties. Id.  Although
the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act provides that persons affected or ag-
grieved by a final agency decision are entitled to judicial  review, this stage of review
is “too little, too late” because property owners near or adjacent to a claimant’s
property likely will have already suffered irreparable harm. Id.  Once a land-use
regulation is not applied pursuant to Measure 37, development begins, and a “seri-
ous and imminent risk of an erroneous deprivation of property interests” is created;
thus, a post-deprivation hearing cannot be “meaningful.” Id.
74 Id .  Among the secondary grounds, the court held that Measure 37 (1) accom-
plished an invalid and unconstitutional suspension of laws, (2) effected an unconsti-
tutional delegation of power to local governments, and (3) violated the substantive
due-process rights of neighboring property owners (whose property values would be
compromised by waivers of land-use regulations). Id.
75 Press Release, Oregonians In Action, Marion County Judge Overturns Mea-
sure 37 (Oct. 14, 2005), available at  http://oia.org/Measure37overturnPR.htm.
76 Julie Sullivan, Firestorm over Measure 37 Clouds Judge’s Long-Held Dream ,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Dec. 4, 2005, at B1.
77 Id . The Constitution Party of Oregon filed the petition.  The drive for signa-
tures is now encountering technical difficulties because some of the signature pages
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by the reversal of James’s decision in the Oregon Supreme
Court,78 OIA is planning further challenges to Oregon’s land-use
laws at the ballot box in 2006.79
Of course, large numbers of Oregonians applauded James’s de-
cision as well.  Planning advocates called it a “victory for the
state’s natural landscape.”80 The land-conservation watchdog
group 1000 Friends of Oregon hailed the ruling:81  “We are very
pleased that the court recognized Measure 37 is not about fair-
ness.  [The measure] is unfair at its core,” said Executive Direc-
tor Bob Stacey.  “We need compensation that makes landowners
whole, not waivers that make them rich.”82  Whether or not that
will happen is something only time will tell.
For now, property-rights advocates have prevailed.  The Ore-
gon Supreme Court unanimously overruled Judge James’s opin-
ion on February 21, 2006.83  Noted one commentator, “The
[Oregon Supreme C]ourt utterly demolished the reasoning of the
lower-court judge who threw out Measure 37 last fall.  Appar-
ently, neither [Measure 37’s] nonchalant treatment of neighbors
nor its undermining of governmental authority invalidates it from
a constitutional standpoint.”84
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Paul DeMuniz posited that
the court’s “only function in any case involving a constitutional
challenge to an initiative measure is to ensure that the measure
does not contravene any pertinent, applicable constitutional pro-
visions.”85  The court emphatically concluded that no such provi-
sion had been contravened, holding that:
(1) [the] plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; (2) Measure 37 does
not impede the legislative plenary power; (3) Measure 37 does
did not bear the required identification numbers.  David Steves, Recall Petitions for
Salem Judge May be Recalled , REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Jan. 10, 2006, at
D1.
78 See  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., Civil No. S52875 (Or., filed Feb. 21,
2006) available at  http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.
79 Oppenheimer, supra  note 7.  See supra note 6 for a listing of current initiatives
registered with the Secretary of State.
80 Oppenheimer, supra  note 7.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See MacPherson , Civil No. S52875 (Or., filed Feb. 21, 2006) available at  http://
www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.
84 Peter Wong, Editorial, Court Clears the Way for 37 Kinds of Damage , OREGO-
NIAN (Portland), Feb. 22, 2006, at B6.
85 MacPherson , Civil No. S52875 (Or., filed Feb. 21, 2006) available at  http://
www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.
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not violate the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of
Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution; (4) Measure
37 does not violate the suspension of laws provision contained
in Article I, section 22, of the Oregon Constitution; (5) Mea-
sure 37 does not violate separation of powers constraints; (6)
Measure 37 does not waive impermissibly sovereign immunity;
and (7) Measure 37 does not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The trial court’s con-
trary conclusions under the state and federal constitutions
were erroneous and must be reversed.86
In so holding, the court accorded ample respect to voter man-
date and principles of judicial restraint, noting that the constitu-
tionality determination “is the only one that this court is
empowered to make” and that “[w]hether Measure 37 as a policy
choice is wise or foolish, farsighted or blind, is beyond this
court’s purview.”87
While property-rights advocates celebrated the decision, and
land-use proponents continued to demand legislative action to
provide a “fair” solution, neither side is certain as to the future of
Measure 37 claims.88  The Oregon Supreme Court held Measure
37 to be constitutional, but it did not answer the numerous ques-
tions surrounding the law’s implementation.89  When MacPher-
son  was handed down, there were twenty-nine lawsuits with
related legal questions “winding their way through the lower
courts.”90  Following the decision, Governor Kulongoski called
upon the state legislature: “Without some action by the Legisla-
ture, it may be years before additional court cases begin to clarify
all of the uncertainties about the law.  In the process, those cases
will entail substantial costs and frustrations for state and local
governments and private-property owners throughout Ore-
gon.”91  Additionally, the implementation of Measure 37 may be
further complicated as the upcoming November ballot likely will
feature initiatives that attempt to limit Measure 37’s reach.92
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Peter Wong, High Court Upholds Measure 37 , STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Feb.
22, 2006 at A1.
89 Steve Law, Measure 37 Legal Interpretations Remain Unresolved , STATESMAN
J. (Salem, Or.) Feb. 22, 2006 at A1; Eric Pryne, Oregon Property Rights Law Up-
held , SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006 at B1.
90 Law, supra  note 89.
91 Pryne, supra  note 89.
92 Laura Oppenheimer, It’s Settled: Measure 37 Lives , OREGONIAN (Portland),
Feb. 22, 2006 at A1.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-JUN-06 12:09
292 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 20, 2005]
Thus, for the moment, the property-rights battle “shifts back to
local governments, the Oregon Legislature and voters,” meaning
the debate likely will drag on for years and may well end up back
at the Oregon Supreme Court.93  As one commentator noted,
“We’re right back where we started.  This was an entertaining,
but unproductive, side track.”94  But even as the future imple-
mentation of Measure 37 remains unclear, this victory for prop-
erty-rights advocates reverberates across the country.95
Beyond Oregon, land-compensation statutes like Measure 37
are springing up across the nation as groups eager to replicate
Oregon’s example fly out David Hunnicutt, Ross Day, and Bill
Moshofsky to explain how it was done here.96  If a property-
rights referendum can pass in a “proudly liberal, blue state car-
ried by both John Kerry and Al Gore,” then what is to stop simi-
lar measures across the heart of the country?97  Additionally,
Measure 37 has caused anti-sprawl legislation all over the coun-
try to lose political momentum.98  The measure “has really ex-
cited the property-rights movement and suggests to its supporters
that they can challenge smart-growth laws everywhere.”99  No
doubt, the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in MacPherson  will
only add to the enthusiasm.
While the property-rights war rages in other states, Oregon
gears up for another ballot-initiative season100 and the “Big
Look” at land-use planning authorized by the Oregon Legisla-
ture in 2005.101  What will come of it?  That is the multi-million
(or billion) dollar question.  So far, no one seems to have the
answer.  OIA seems to have the upper hand for now, but are
93 Law, supra  note 89.
94 Oppenheimer, supra  note 92.
95 Pryne, supra  note 89.
96 Oppenheimer supra  note 38.
97 See, e.g., Carol Saviak, What Florida Can Learn From Oregon About State
Land Use Regulation, Ecologic, May 15, 2005, available at  http://www.eco.freedom.
org/el/20050502/saviak.shtml.
98 Harden, supra  note 24.
99 Id .
100 OIA and 1000 Friends are already gearing up for numerous ballot measures in
2006. See supra note 6.
101 The 2005 Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 82, referred to as the “Big
Look,” which created a ten-member task force to evaluate the land-use system and
recommend changes for the 2007 and 2009 Legislatures. Press Release, Governor’s
Office, State Appoints Oregon Task Force on Land Use Planning (Jan. 26, 2006),
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/30_year_review/land_use_task_force_press_re-
lease_012606.pdf.
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Oregonians really ready to get rid of the land-use planning sys-
tem that makes the state so special?  Is there not a compromise
out there that can provide compensation for some landowners
without bankrupting the government while maintaining the core
of statewide land-use planning?
Oregonians need the state legislature to take action on this is-
sue102—to find a solution that compensates property owners with
legitimate claims without “sacrificing our quality of life and hurt-
ing neighbors.”103  This Article argues that TDRs offer, at the
very least, the beginning of a solution.
C. Legitimate Goals of Land-Use Planning:
Responding to Discontent
Just as proponents of land-use regulation and environmental
protections must concede some meaningful limits on the govern-
ment’s ability to interfere with the rights of private property
owners, so too must property-rights advocates admit that, at
some point, unrestricted and unplanned development creates so-
cial, economic, and environmental dangers and costs that must be
controlled.  Development on a parcel of land inevitably creates
external impacts on the surrounding lands and the community in
general.  The most obvious examples of such impacts are envi-
ronmental: air and watershed damage, erosion, and loss of criti-
cal habitat.  The less obvious impacts are political and systemic,
and often are described by a single term that encompasses a wide
and complicated group of phenomena: sprawl.104
Sprawl is a general term for unrestricted or unplanned devel-
opment, and volumes have been written describing its negative
effects.105  If local governments are unable (or unwilling) to de-
102 Telephone Interview with David Hunnicutt, President, Oregonians In Action
(Jan. 13, 2006). Hunnicutt blamed the Governor and state legislature’s inaction
while noting that the battle over property-rights in Oregon was going to drag on
whichever way the Supreme Court came down with MacPherson .
103 Brad Cain, Associated Press, Top Oregon Court OKs Property Rights Law
That Spawned Washington Initiative , THE OLYMPIAN, Feb. 21, 2006, (last visited May
24, 2006).
104 See generally Patrick Gallagher, The Environmental, Social and Cultural Im-
pacts of Sprawl , 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 219 (2000); James E. Holloway &
Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits of Government Powers: Effecting Nature,
Markets and the Quality of Life Under the Takings and Other provisions , 9 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 421 (2001); Salkin, supra  note 56, at 276-307.
105 See generally  William Whyte, Urban Sprawl, in THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS
133, 133-50 (Fortune eds. 1958); OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER
ON THE URBAN SPRAWL DEBATE (2002), MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METRO-
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 22 28-JUN-06 12:09
294 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 20, 2005]
cide where and when development occurs, to limit densities, and
to allocate uses, then infrastructure and provision of services will
be—to say the very least—inefficient.106  This imposes extra
costs, not only on taxpayers and the character of communities,
but also on property owners and developers, who pay at least
some of the costs of their unrestricted freedom.107  Minimizing
these externalities through land-use planning and regulation is a
necessity, but inevitably engenders resentment and resistance
from property owners.
As discussed above, the failure of each side of the land-use
debate to address valid criticisms eventually injures both.  Com-
prehensive land-use regulation is in need of some limiting princi-
ple beyond the ambiguous constitutional-takings limits that apply
when a regulation goes “too far.”  In the absence of some clearly
articulated judicial or legislative limits, public distrust of the sys-
tem and outrage over its perceived or real excesses can only
grow.108  However, that fundamental feeling of unfairness is only
one negative effect of Oregon’s current land-use regulation para-
digm.  The uncertainty faced by landowners plays into the hands
of land-use speculators.  If the use rights an owner possesses to-
day may be taken away tomorrow, a “get what you can, while
you can” mentality is inevitable.109
POLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2002); DOLORES HAYDEN, A FIELD
GUIDE TO SPRAWL (2004); SUBURBAN SPRAWL: CULTURE, THEORY, AND POLITICS
(Matthew J. Lindstrom & Hugh Bartling eds., 2004); ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUB-
URBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM (2000).
106 See JON C. TEAFORD, POST SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE
EDGE CITIES 88-160 (1997); JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS:
IMPROVING ON THE NEW CITY, RESTORING THE OLD CITY, RIGHTING THE REGION
48 (1995); ORFIELD, supra  note 105, at 67.
107 See  Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Inst., Address at the ULI
District Counsel Meeting: The Costs of Sprawl Revisited (Apr. 15, 2004), available
at  http://www.anthonydowns.com/sprawlrevisited.htm.  The statistics in the speech
are derived from a study funded by the Transit Cooperative Research Program.
TCRP Report 74: Costs of Sprawl-2000, available at  http://gulliver.trb.org/ publica-
tions/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_74-a.pdf.
108 See  Homsey, supra  note 37, at 297-98 (recognizing the difficulty of achieving
an equitable solution to takings compensation).
109 It is this “rush on the resource” phenomenon that forces local governments to
institute development moratoria when major changes in zoning regulations are
under consideration. See  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337-41 (2002). The moment possible changes are announced,
land-use speculation skyrockets, marked by a rash of permit applications aimed at
vesting development rights before the new (and presumably more restrictive) regu-
lations are in place. See id.  This phenomenon occurred in Washington State with the
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By their very nature, zoning regulations create some barriers
to development.  Unfortunately, these barriers sometimes stymie
not only undesirable development but also desirable develop-
ment that addresses community needs, such as high-wage em-
ployment and low-income housing.  To redress this side effect,
the system should allow for proactive creation of good develop-
ment opportunities (however defined), while simultaneously cur-
tailing undesirable development.
Outrage over perceived or real systemic excesses, however,
cannot really aid the rights and interests of property owners if it
fuels an abrogation of the comprehensive land-use planning sys-
tem that safeguards the community’s welfare in the first place.
Now that Measure 37 has been upheld on appeal, there will be
some problematic consequences for Oregon.  The measure pro-
vides no source of funding for compensation or fees, so compen-
sation for even a minority of claims is not a viable alternative.110
Thus, the only practical option available for most local govern-
ments is to offer some form of waiver remedy as allowed under
the new law.111  The goals of comprehensive regulation, such as
good planning and efficient services and infrastructure, are sub-
verted if individual owners can choose whether or not to abide
by the plans.
Just as significantly, Oregon’s local governments, already
under immense pressure from both sides, face the prospect of
civil litigation for partial-takings damages every time they enact a
land-use regulation.  Significantly, government entities against
whom Measure 37 claims are filed appear to be responsible for
paying attorney fees and costs of claimants who actually bring
their claims in civil court, even for those claims that eventually
passage of a statewide comprehensive land-use program. See Joseph Elfelt, Edito-
rial, A Last Hope To Referee The Great Land Rush , SEATTLE TIMES, May 2, 1991, at
A11; Eric Pryne, Real-Estate Vesting Stampedes Are One Target Of Initiative 547 ,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1990, at A1 (noting landowners’ efforts to have property
rights vested before changed land-use regulation take effect).
110 1000 Friends of Oregon, Why We are Opposed to Waivers of Zoning Protec-
tions & No Public Process, http://www.friends.org/issues/M37/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2006).
111 See, e.g. , David Bates, Pair Seek Eye-Popping $15.6 Million , NEWS-REGISTER
(McMinnville, Or.), Jan. 27, 2005 available at  http://www.newsregister.com/news/re-
sults.cfm?story_no=189684 (exemplifying Measure 37 claims that exceed realistic
budgetary amounts to pay compensation); David Bates, Ideas Sought for Measure 37
Funding , NEWS-REGISTER (McMinnville, Or.), Feb. 15, 2005 available at  http://
www.newsregister.com/news/results.cfm?story_no=190341 (discussing Yamhill
County’s lack of funding to pay compensation on Measure 37 claims).
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fail.112  The chilling effect of this knowledge on governments con-
sidering necessary land-use regulation should not be underesti-
mated.  After the passage of Measure 37, several local
governments began to consider “blanket waivers” of land-use
regulations, by either de jure enactments or de facto administra-
tive waivers for all claimants.113
Moreover, private landowners themselves are hurt by the un-
certainty created by this private veto power over land-use plan-
ning.  Prior to Measure 37, landowners could expect that land-
use regulations for neighboring properties would not change
without public proceedings and solid public-welfare justifications
(or in the case of a variance, a showing of unusual hardship).114
Even where proposals were made to change regulations or create
a variance, neighbors were entitled to produce evidence that a
change would be damaging.115  By contrast, when a decision is
made about a Measure 37 claim, under the terms of the law, no
consideration is due regarding the impact of a zoning change on
neighboring properties or the surrounding community.116  As
112 Measure 37 § 6 available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/meas/m37_text.html.
113 League of Oregon Cities, Measure 37 Advisor, Feb. 11, 2000, page 4.  The
Oregon Attorney General’s office issued a February 24, 2005 statement that “blan-
ket waivers,” in the form of local ordinances removing land-use restrictions across
the jurisdiction before any claims are even made, are not permitted under the mea-
sure, and entities must ascertain whether a claim fits within the measure’s require-
ments before providing any relief—compensation or otherwise. Letter from Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, to Lane Shetterly, Director, Oregon Dept. of Land Con-
servation and Dev. (Feb. 24, 2005) available at  http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/pdf/
m37doj.pdf.  Nevertheless, there is little in the measure to prevent local govern-
ments from simply granting waiver after waiver.  Some local entities seem to be
engaging in this behavior even when they have not ascertained that a given claim
meets Measure 37’s requirements for compensation (such as loss of property value
caused by a regulation). See  David Bates, County 1st in State to OK Claims , NEWS-
REGISTER (McMinnville, Or.), Feb. 3, 2005 available at  http://www.newsregister.
com/news/results.cfm?story_no=189907 (discussing Yamhill County granting waivers
for Measure 37 claims).
114 E.g. , Roseta v. Washington County, 254 Or. 161, 168, 458 P.2d 405, 409 (1969)
(voiding administrative decision because no justification was available for judicial
review).
115 Auckland v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Multnomah County, 21 Or. App. 596,
599-603, 536 P.2d 444, 446-47 (1975).
116 The text of Measure 37 does not discuss any notice requirements for neigh-
bors, see generally  Measure 37 § 6 available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/ elections/
nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html. OIA has been foremost in arguing that neigh-
bors do not have a right to participate in the decision-making process, through hear-
ings or other input, of a Measure 37 claim. Don Hamilton, Nervous Neighbors Start
to Gauge Results of Vote , PORTLAND TRIB., Jan. 25, 2005, available at  http://
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noted in Judge James’s decision overturning Measure 37, to the
extent that state and local governments do not create procedures
to fill this gap, this would seem to be a violation of neighboring
landowners’ procedural due-process rights.117  The Measure 37
response to the problems in land-use law illustrates the dangers
of the pretense that Blackstonian dominion should be the over-
riding principle of private-property ownership.118
Oregon is deadlocked over the future of land use.  Measure 37
and anti-Kelo  measures address the rights of property owners
without acknowledging either the effect of uncontrolled growth
or the consequences of limiting local governments’ discretion to
use eminent domain.  On the other hand, adherents to the old
land-use regulatory regime cut against voter mandate, seeking to
defeat Measure 37 and its kin in the courts without addressing
the underlying criticisms of a comprehensive land-use system
that has been in place since 1973.  There is a dire need for some
compromise to resolve the clash of worldviews and perceived in-
terests represented in the struggle over Measure 37.  TDRs may
point to a way out of this dilemma.
III
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (TDR)
PROGRAMS: OVERVIEW
The TDR concept can be traced to a 1961 article by Gerald
Lloyd, Transferable Density in Connection with Density Zoning,
New Approaches to Residential Development .119  At the time, a
www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=28015. Despite Measure 37’s failure to
provide for administrative rights of neighbors, however, the State and local govern-
ments have statutory and common-law obligations that include certain procedural
requirements for changes in land-use regulations, sometimes including hearings.
117 See  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv. Civil No. 05-C10444 (Cir. Ct.
Marion County, Or., Oct. 14, 2005), available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/ doc-
uments/Measure37_000.pdf.  In overruling James’s decision, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that Measure 37 could not be found invalid merely because it did not
provide for these specific procedural protections, since the measure did not preclude
the State or local entities from using such procedures in their decision-making
processes. See MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., Civil No. S52875 (Or., filed
Feb. 21, 2006) available at  http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/ S52875.htm.
118 See generally  Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Mod-
ern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights , 75 WASH. L.
REV. 857 (2000) (discussing the property rights movement and the role of the state).
119 Gerald Lloyd, Transferable Density in Connection with Density Zoning, New
Approaches to Residential Development, URBAN LAND INST. TECHNICAL BULL. 136
app. G (Jan. 1961). See also WILLIAM FULTON ET AL., TDRS AND OTHER MARKET-
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practice referred to as “clustering” allowed developers to trans-
fer development rights that were restricted in one part of a devel-
opment (the “sending site”) onto another area in the same
development (the “receiving site”).120  Lloyd’s article suggested
development credits also should be available for adjacent receiv-
ing sites not owned by the original developer.121  In 1972 John
Costonis published an article advocating even further expansion
of this idea by dropping the adjacency requirement entirely.122
Under Costonis’ “Chicago Plan,” no new density would be cre-
ated, so the overall density of the area would remain stable.123
More than 130 local governments and twenty-two states have
adopted some form of TDR program.124  TDR programs in their
current form require designation of sending sites eligible for sev-
erable development rights.125  The sending-site element of a
TDR program can be either zoning-based or voluntary.  In the
zoning-based form, regulations are created for the sending-site
zones through the normal zoning process, and TDRs are offered
to owners as a form of mitigation or compensation for the restric-
BASED LAND MECHANISMS: HOW THEY WORK AND THEIR ROLE IN SHAPING MET-
ROPOLITAN GROWTH 7-8 (2004), available at  http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/
20040629_fulton.pdf (describing how a TDR system operates).
120 RICK PRUETZ, BEYOND TAKINGS AND GIVINGS 34 (2003).  New York City’s
1961 zoning resolution was one example of a more relaxed  “clustering” approach.
See  Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the
Well-Considered Plan , 50 BROOK L. REV. 867, 873-75 (1984) (discussing the 1961
zoning resolution). The program allowed density to be transferred from one parcel
to another contiguous parcel owned by the same party.  In 1968, the clustering pro-
tocol was loosened by a new amendment allowing sale of development rights to new
parties for use on contiguous or adjacent properties. PRUETZ, supra  at 34; see also
William Neuman, Selling the Air Above , N.Y. TIMES Mar. 5, 2006, § 11 at 1. (discuss-
ing the history of New York City’s TDR program in the context of the current boom
in buying and selling airspace rights). For more information on air space transfer
rights, see generally  N.Y. City Planning Commission Res. C 980682 ZSM (Jan. 6,
1999); Martin Gottlieb, Zoning Fight Again Imperils Grand Central , N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1986, at B1; David Dunlap, Builders Lose Bid to Transfer Air Rights , N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1989, at B1; Steven D. Kowaloff, Grand Central Zoning Game: Pro-
ject Symbolized Contest Between City and Developer , N.Y. L. J., Sept. 20, 1989, at 33;
Harry Berkowitz, City Backs Air Rights Transfer , NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1989, at 6.
121 Lloyd, supra  note 119, app. G, at 136-37.
122 John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks , 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 594 (1972).
123 Id .
124 State Environmental Resource Center, Transfer of Development Rights, http:/
/www.serconline.org/tdr/background.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
125 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 29-30.
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tions.126 In return for a TDR, the landowner accepts a negative
covenant on the land that at least semi-permanently restricts de-
velopment to that contemplated by the regulations.127  In the vol-
untary form, a baseline capacity for development is set, and
property owners are eligible for TDRs if they waive a portion of
that development capacity by creating a negative covenant.128
The TDRs issued to sending-site owners are fungible, and may
be purchased and used by qualifying developers on receiving
sites.129  Receiving-site developers have the choice of developing
at the present baseline zoning, or purchasing TDRs to develop
past that baseline capacity.130
A. Benefits of TDR Programs
TDR programs allow coordination of efforts to manage preser-
vation and control development patterns.131  At the same time,
the programs assess regulatory impacts on property owners and
effectively mitigate the diminution in property values that might
result from regulatory restrictions on use of their land.132  More-
over, most TDR programs allow localized flexibility in their
goals, methods, and procedures.133
TDR programs address the concerns of property-rights advo-
cates (1) by providing real assessment of the financial impacts of
contemplated land-use goals on property owners, and (2) by re-
sponding to those impacts with access to mitigating rights in the
form of transferable development credits.134  If good land-use
126 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see generally  Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978); see generally infra  Part IV.A.
127 The negative easement is permanent, but can be made temporary by provi-
sions in the easement language allowing the sending site to be converted to a receiv-
ing site at the option of the TDR program administrators. PRUETZ, supra  note 120,
at 76.   The owner of the property at that time would, of course, need to purchase
TDRs to regain the development rights that had previously been removed from the
property. Id .
128 Id. at 30.
129 Id. at 30-31.
130 Id .
131 Id. at 36-43.
132 Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, James C. Nicholas & Brian D. Leebrick, Trans-
ferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum , 30 URB. LAW. 441, 444-
447 (1998); see also Franklin G. Lee, Transferable Development Rights and the Dep-
rivation of All Beneficial Use: Can TDRs Salvage Regulations That Would Otherwise
Constitute A Taking? , 34 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 707 (1998).
133 See generally PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 75-79.
134 Juergensmeyer, Nicholas & Leebrick, supra  note 132, at 444-447.
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planning requires use restrictions on a certain group of proper-
ties, those properties can be designated as sending sites.135  If the
restricted owners take advantage of the TDR program, the loss
of potential use of their land will be mitigated by their receipt of
tradable credits, or TDRs.136  A successful TDR program re-
quires careful advance assessment of any contemplated regula-
tions, including (1) the financial impact on regulated properties,
(2) the impact on the value of development rights that must be
transferred to be used, and (3) the impact of making those devel-
opment rights available for sale on the TDR market.137
TDR programs address land-use regulation goals at two
points: sending-site application and receiving-site application.138
Once a program is established, new categories of sending and re-
ceiving sites can be created in response to newly arising regula-
tory needs.139
B. Sending-Site Applications
TDR program goals are also implemented by selecting send-
ing-site categories responsive to a community’s land-use needs.
For instance, if the local community has experienced typical
sprawling growth without thought to preservation of dwindling
farmlands, a TDR program might include agricultural land of a
certain quality as one category of sending site.140  If gentrification
in the area has created an affordable-housing shortage, the pro-
gram might designate existing low-income housing as eligible for
sending-site status.141  In this way, any  resource can be preserved
through sending-site designations: recreational areas, forest land,
sensitive environmental zones, historic landmarks, etc.—once
135 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 29-30.
136 Id. at 30-31.
137 See id.  at 57-60.
138 Id. at 29-31.
139 See id . at 197 (discussing how Los Angeles originally created a program as a
general method of channeling density growth toward areas in which the growth was
welcomed, and away from areas it was not.  Ten years later, the city adopted a pro-
gram to preserve historical buildings within development sites).
140 Maryland leads the nation in preservation of agricultural land through TDR
programs. See id . at 211.  Calvert and Montgomery counties have preserved almost
50,000 acres of farmland. Id.  at 176, 211.
141 Seattle, Washington has implemented a TDR program over the last twenty
years with the goal of improving availability and retention of affordable housing. Id.
at 233-36. Importantly, one of the requirements for sending-site qualification is com-
pliance with housing and building codes. Id. at 233.
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sending sites are designated, the TDR mechanism operates to
shift development pressures away from those areas.
Alternatively, a community may use sending-site designations
to shape growth in a more general way, by creating sending zones
in areas designated for limited growth.  This kind of “shaping”
sending zone can be used to prevent sprawl, ensure the efficiency
of infrastructure investment, and redirect growth to areas desig-
nated for new development or urban renewal.142
C. Receiving-Site Applications
Program goals may also be implemented by selecting  receiv-
ing-site categories.  As noted above, TDR programs, by restrict-
ing sending-site applications, make growth more desirable in
areas not  reserved for sending sites.  This desirability can be en-
hanced by drawing receiving-site categories to encompass desira-
ble growth areas.  As with the sending-site categories discussed
above, receiving-site categories may be crafted according to gen-
eral “shaping” principles or may be designated topically.143
Thus, receiving-site categories can be drawn to support either
general planning goals or more targeted projects such as creating
affordable housing or needed medical facilities, reinvesting in
blighted neighborhoods, or increasing density and mixed-use
functionality.144
D. The Role of TDR Banks
TDR banks, sometimes called “development banks,” serve
many useful functions within a TDR program.  First, a TDR
142 Cupertino, California has implemented such a program, designed to prevent
unmanageable growth of traffic. Id. at 179-80. The program differs from typical
density-transfer programs because it is based at least partially on trip-generation
rates. Id . at 180. Instead of trading density, sending sites and receiving sites trade
trip-generation capacity. Id .
143 For example, when New York desired to create redevelopment in the South
Street Seaport district while preserving the historical integrity of the area, it desig-
nated a Historic District that included both sending (historic) sites and receiving
(redevelopment) sites. Because of the combination of historic-preservation and re-
development initiatives, the once endangered area is now a tourist destination. Sa-
rah J. Stevenson, Banking on TDRs: The Government’s Role as Banker of
Transferable Development Rights , 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1345-47 (1998).
144 Traverse City, Michigan, for example, has implemented a program to create a
desired medical facility by redeveloping the grounds of an old hospital campus from
the 1800s.  The program allows transfer of development capacity from one part of
the site to others, upon the condition that natural and historical areas of the site are
preserved. PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 442-43.
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bank may act as a sort of holding facility for sending-site
TDRs.145  This holding function is important for several reasons.
First, a sending-site owner may use TDRs as collateral for
loans.146  The TDR bank serves as a natural escrow account, and
can verify the value and marketability of the TDRs.147  In the
event of default, the bank can serve as a guarantor on the loans,
and will simply take ownership of the TDRs and sell them to a
receiving-site owner.148  Second, the holding function removes
many transaction costs for buyers and sellers, who would other-
wise experience supply and demand time-lags.149  Third, receiv-
ing-site owners further benefit because TDR banks make
possible consolidated purchases of TDRs from multiple sending
sites.150
TDR banks also provide a stabilizing function.  As established
institutions, the banks can help educate the public through out-
reach programs for real-estate professionals and land-use law-
yers, who in turn can inform their clients of the new options
created by TDR programs.151  Moreover, as noted above, TDR
banks reduce transaction costs for buyers and sellers through
predictable and standardized procedures, recordkeeping for
TDR transactions and easements, and streamlined appraisal and
valuation processes.152  Owners of TDRs who do not wish to
hold them for collateralization may sell them directly to the
bank.153  The bank can therefore be utilized to provide mini-
mum-price guarantees for TDRs, encouraging the success of the
TDR program and ensuring that TDRs offered as compensation
for regulatory takings have actual value.154
Finally, TDR banks can be used as a repository of funds for
outright government purchases of easements and dedications.155
One of the purposes of a TDR program is to avoid the necessity
145 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1341-44. See also PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at
160-61.
146 Stevenson, supra note 143, at 1349.
147 Id.  at 1341-43, 1349; see also PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 160-61.
148 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1349.
149 Id. 1341-43; see also PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 160.
150 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1343.
151 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 161.
152 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1342-44. See also PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at
161.
153 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 160.
154 Id .
155 See Id .
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of outright takings, but in those instances in which TDR solu-
tions are not appropriate, eminent domain actions may be neces-
sary.156  For example, eminent domain may be necessary when a
sending-site owner has opted not to participate in a voluntary
TDR program, but the local government nevertheless decides to
secure the land for preservation.  Accordingly, TDR banks in
several programs have been empowered to act under eminent
domain.157  As another important practical advantage, those
lands that are purchased outright for preservation will retain de-
velopment rights that then can be severed from the property and
sold to recover part of the acquisition costs.158
E. Advantages for Sending-Site Owners
Sending-site owners gain several benefits from TDR programs.
First, and most obvious, sending-site owners who did not intend
to develop their property anyway reap the monetary benefits of
receiving a tradable and potentially valuable commodity.  How-
ever, the value of this benefit depends heavily on the market, and
sending-site owners under voluntary programs may decide that
actual development of their land benefits them more than sale of
their TDRs.  Thus, some TDR programs offer participants addi-
tional development bonuses; for example, a sending-site owner
who would receive the equivalent of only one TDR by develop-
ing her own land might, by participating in the program, become
eligible for four or five TDRs, and therefore a larger and much
more certain return on her investment.159
Participation in TDR programs may also qualify landowners
for federal, state, or local tax deductions for conservation ease-
156 Important compensation issues arise when comparing compensation for an
eminent-domain condemnation to compensation for TDRs.  As mentioned in the
Penn Central  decision, it is the value of reasonable “investment-backed  expecta-
tions” that is being lost, not speculative value.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 US 104, 127 (1978) (emphasis added). A TDR program will need to
establish its own measurements for compensation that comport with takings law and
the goals of the program, both for the purchase of development rights under the
program, and for outright purchase of property.
157 For example, Malibu Coastal Program’s Coastal Conservancy, and San Luis
Obispo County’s Land Conservancy.
158 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 159.
159 William Fulton et al., Brookings Institute Center on Urban and Metropolitan
Policy, TDRs and Other Market-Based Land Mechanisms: How They Work and
Their Role in Shaping Metropolitan Growth 8 (2004), http://www.brookings.edu/ur-
ban/pubs/20040629_fulton.pdf.
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ments or similar programs.160  Moreover, where the negative cov-
enants imposed by TDR programs reduce property values,
landowners may benefit from lower property taxes.161  Finally,
and perhaps most importantly for many property owners, unsold
TDRs can be used as security for loans.162  Thus, owners who are
not interested in fully developing presently held parcels can lev-
erage their TDRs to fund, for example, the purchase of more
land.
F. Advantages for Receiving-Site Owners
TDR programs allow participating receiving-site owners to lev-
erage funds spent on TDRs to achieve further benefits.  For ex-
ample, they too may be eligible for city, county, or state tax
deductions, abatement programs, and other incentives.163
But for developers, the real value of many TDR programs may
be the increased government emphasis on finding suitable sites
for growth and development, and on fostering the use of them.164
A successful TDR program requires local governments to facili-
tate desirable development as a tradeoff for the restrictions on
undesirable development.  This benefit is especially important in
Oregon, where urban growth boundaries, as presently conceived,
have limited the availability of developable sites to “urban” or
“urbanizable” areas.165
IV
LEGAL CONCERNS REGARDING TDRS
There are three aspects of TDR programs that must be consid-
ered carefully to avoid legal and strategic problems: the baseline
regulations on both sending and receiving sites, the TDRs them-
selves, and the negative covenants.  This section explores poten-
160 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1340.
161 Id. at 1341.  This loss of tax revenue may be recovered through the increased
value of receiving sites. Id.
162 Id. at 1349.
163 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1340.
164 For example, the New Jersey Pinelands program caused the government to
undergo an extensive analysis to identify areas suitable for development. Id . at
1356-1357.
165 Robert H. Freilich, Smart Growth in Western Metro Areas , 43 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 687, 693 (2003); Myrl L. Duncan, Agriculture as a Resource: Statewide
Land Use Programs for the Preservation of Farmland , 14 ECOLOGY L. Q. 401, 482
(1987).
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tial problems with respect to these aspects, first in terms of
sending sites, then receiving sites, and finally by looking at mis-
cellaneous legal and structural issues.
A. Sending-Site Challenges: Effect of TDRs
on Takings Analysis
As discussed above, some TDR programs, such as Seattle’s,166
are completely voluntary on the sending-site side.  In those pro-
grams, sending-site owners, in return for TDRs, may choose to
create a negative covenant binding their property to extra land-
use restrictions.  Such programs clearly are not vulnerable to tak-
ings challenges because of their voluntary nature.
Other programs simply impose restrictions that conform to
program goals, and TDRs are offered to mitigate the impact of
the program on the affected property owners.  In this latter type
of program, if the result of the regulation is to deprive the prop-
erty of all beneficial economic use, it may be challengeable as a
Lucas -style regulatory taking.167
Considerable debate remains regarding the effect that a grant
of TDRs has on the takings status of regulatory restrictions ap-
plied to a sending site.  It is possible that, in non-voluntary, zon-
ing-based programs, both the regulatory restrictions placed on
the sending site and the negative covenant required as a condi-
tion of receiving TDRs create a taking if they deny all economi-
cally beneficial use of the land under Lucas ,168 or if they amount
to a taking under the evaluation set forth in Penn Central Trans-
portation Corp. v. City of New York .169
The first Supreme Court decision to address this issue, Penn
Central , did so indirectly, and seemed to classify TDRs as
residual value left in the property after land-use regulations are
applied.170  However, at least one recent Supreme Court opinion
166 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 233-36.
167 See  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (re-
stating the notion that “[a] statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if it ‘denies an owner economically viable use of his land ’”) (Empha-
sis in original).
168 See id.
169 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). Penn
Central  indicated that general loss of opportunity would not be considered a taking,
only loss of existing profitable use or interference with “distinct investment-backed
expectations.” Id .
170 Id.  at 137. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that a
taking had occurred, counted TDRs on the compensation side, and would have re-
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suggests that a future decision could legally categorize TDRs on
the side of just compensation, rather than residual value (i.e.,
TDRs would be considered compensation for lost property
value, not retained value left over after land-use regulations are
applied).
In the 1997 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency  deci-
sion, Justice Scalia authored a partial concurrence urging that if a
government easement leaves no economic use, a taking has oc-
curred, regardless of TDR availability.171  When TDRs are given,
Scalia opined, they cannot serve as residual value somehow neu-
tralizing the regulation’s effect.172  Rather, TDRs should be eval-
uated on the “compensation side of the takings analysis” because
their classification as residual value essentially would allow gov-
ernment to provide only partial compensation for a full taking.173
In other words, governments could avoid ever fully compensat-
ing landowners for regulatory takings simply by issuing TDRs
and claiming that, since the property retains some value, no tak-
ing has occurred.174 For this reason, Scalia argued that TDRs
should serve as partial or full compensation for a taking, depend-
ing on the amount of the taking and the value of the TDRs
created.175
Because the Court has not yet clearly designated TDRs as ei-
ther compensation or residual value, implementation of TDR
programs must include clarification on this point.  Based on the
manded to the lower court for determination of whether that compensation was a
full measure of the taking. Id . at 150-52.
171 520 U.S. 725, 747 (1997). In Suitum , the Court ruled only on the ripeness of the
takings complaint, and expressly refused to rule on the role of the TDRs attached to
the property (which was ineligible for development). Id.  at 728-29. Suitum’s prop-
erty had been classified as falling within a “Stream Environment Zone,” or an area
carrying runoff into the watershed. Id . at 729.  The land-use system did not provide
for variances, so the Court found that the agency’s finding was sufficiently final to
satisfy the ripeness doctrine. Id.  at 739.
172 Id.  at 747.
The right to use and develop one’s own land is quite distinct from the right
to confer upon someone else an increased power to use and develop his
land. The latter is valuable, to be sure, but it is a new  right conferred upon
the landowner in exchange for the taking, rather than a reduction  of the
taking.
Id .
173 Id. at 750.
174 Id. at 748.
175 Id. at 749-50.  In contrast to Justice Scalia’s close reasoning in Suitum , Justice
Rehnquist appeared simply to have assumed in his Penn Central  dissent that TDRs
would be classified as compensation. Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 150-52.
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current mood of the courts, status as compensation, not residual
value, seems to be the most likely outcome.176  Moreover, the
goal of fairness to private landowners would be evaded if TDRs
were merely a way for government to avoid admitting to (and
fully  compensating) takings of private property.
Of course, regulatory restrictions on some sending sites will
not necessarily create a taking—and no compensation will be due
under takings law—if economically viable uses for the property
remain.177  Nevertheless, because one of the many goals of TDR
programs is to remove some of the unfair impacts of land-use
regulations, creation of TDRs is still appropriate on such sites.
That is, TDRs should not be thought of only  as compensation for
takings.
B. Receiving-Site Challenges
Receiving sites are areas the government has designated as eli-
gible for an increase  in development, so the regulatory structure
of TDR programs will not ordinarily create regulatory-takings
challenges with respect to those sites.  However, the receiving-
site element of TDR programs may be vulnerable in other ways.
176 Putting TDRs on the taking rather than the just-compensation side of
the equation (as the Ninth Circuit did below) is a clever, albeit transparent,
device that seeks to take advantage of a peculiarity of our takings-clause
jurisprudence: Whereas once there is  a taking, the Constitution requires
just (i.e., full) compensation, a regulatory taking generally does not occur
so long as the land retains substantial (albeit not its full) value. If money
that the government-regulator gives to the landowner can be counted on
the question of whether there is  a taking (causing the courts to say that the
land retains substantial value, and has thus not been taken), rather than on
the question of whether the compensation for the taking is adequate, the
government can get away with paying much less. That is all that is going on
here. It would be too obvious, of course, for the government simply to say
“although your land is regulated, our land-use scheme entitles you to a
government payment of $1,000.” That is patently compensation and not
retention of land value.
Suitum , 520 U.S. at 747-48 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). For
other articles discussing the treatment of TDRs as compensation versus residual
value see generally  Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York , 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 653 (2005); Jordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity and Takings
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court Advances Land Use Planning in Tahoe-Sierra , 26
ENVIRONS L. & POL’Y J. 33 (2002); see also Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand
Central to the Sierras: What do we do with Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial
Regulatory Takings? , 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43 (2004).
177 See  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)
(holding that a regulation that denies all economic use of land constitutes a taking).
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1. Strategic Zoning and Overdensification
Critics often charge that governments engage in “strategic zon-
ing,” using TDR programs to set the baseline zoning of receiving
sites at a level below that realistically desirable for those areas.178
Since the success of TDR programs depends on the existence of
markets for development rights, there is an incentive for govern-
ment to set zoning artificially low in receiving-site areas,179
thereby necessitating purchase of TDRs before development can
occur.  Such manipulation of zoning regulations is especially dis-
turbing when governments profit from TDR sales through the
maintenance of TDR banks.180  A local government intent on en-
suring TDR sales could engage in strategic zoning by downzon-
ing receiving zones with the primary goal of raising TDR prices
and the volume of TDR sales.181  Critics assert that, because site
development in such cases is restricted without a legitimate zon-
ing purpose, the regulations lack a rational basis, and therefore
violate developers’ substantive due-process rights.182
Conversely, where baseline zoning initially is set at desirable
levels, critics argue that TDR programs will result in “overden-
sification.”  In other words, governments will permit  receiving-
site developers to use TDRs to exceed desirable development
use or capacity, thus subverting the goals of the comprehensive
plan and holistic zoning.183 Since the baseline zoning already is
set to accommodate desirable development levels, it would seem
to follow that using TDRs to add further development will result
in overdevelopment.  As with strategic zoning, overdensification
is subject to due-process challenges by opponents of the added
growth, possibly on the grounds that the practice amounts to a
type of illegitimate spot zoning.184
TDR advocates argue that these criticisms misconstrue the na-
ture of TDR programs, and more generally misunderstand the
178 Norman Marcus, Transferable Development Rights: A Current Appraisal ,
PROB. AND PROP., Mar.- Apr. 1987, at 40, 41; Jennifer Frankel, Past, Present, and
Future Challenges to Transferable Development Rights , 74 WASH. L. REV. 825, 843-
46 (1999).
179 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1360.
180 Id. at 1361-62.
181 Id. at 1359.
182 Marcus, supra  note 178, at 40; Frankel, supra  note 178, at 843-46.
183 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1360; Frankel, supra note 178, at 843-46.
184 Frankel, supra  note 178, at 843-46.
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nature of zoning regulations themselves.185  First, zoning regula-
tions are never enacted as the only logical arrangement of benefi-
cial uses in an area.186  Planning for flexibility in the actual
capacity of a given site only recognizes that a range of uses may
be appropriate, and allows diverse development within market-
responsive bounds.187  Second, when excess zoning is  allowed,
governments can assert a legitimate health, safety, and welfare
purpose: to curtail growth at the sending site and provide incen-
tives for implementing the favored uses at the receiving site.  The
connection between these goals and local variations in baseline
zoning seems to be “rational” enough to survive the rational-ba-
sis review that the courts currently apply to substantive due-pro-
cess claims.188
Finally, excess growth at a receiving site does not necessarily
work against the goals of a comprehensive plan because the
area’s overall densities are maintained by restricting sending-site
uses.  Drafters of TDR plans can further immunize their pro-
grams from accusations of spot zoning by creating strong legisla-
tive criteria for receiving sites, rather than leaving them to
individual discretionary qualification.189
2. Exactions: Distinguishing Nollan and Dolan
The preceding arguments may be enough to address concerns
regarding overdensification, but the issues involved in strategic
zoning seem to fall within the complex realm of exactions law.
As an alternative to limiting development, the government may
185 Costonis, supra  note 122, at 628-31.
186 Id. at 630.
187 Id. at 628-31.
188 See  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., No. S52875 (Or. Feb. 21, 2006)
available at  http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.
When a statute does not implicate a fundamental right, a party challenging
that statute on substantive due process grounds must show that the statute
bears no reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. . . . The people,
in exercising their initiative power, were free to enact Measure 37 in fur-
therance of policy objectives such as compensating landowners for a dimi-
nution in property value resulting from certain land-use regulations or
otherwise relieving landowners from some of the financial burden of cer-
tain land-use regulations. Neither policy is irrational; no one seriously can
assert that Measure 37 is not reasonably related to those policy objectives.
Id.  (citation omitted).
189 Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Land-
scape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm? , 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459,
481-83 (1999).
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condition development on an “exaction,” or a “concession of
property interests” mitigating the public burden that would oth-
erwise justify limiting use or capacity.190  However, the courts
have opposed making private parties carry an unfair share of that
burden.191
Exactions, therefore, have been subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny, most famously enunciated in the Supreme Court’s Nol-
lan  and Dolan  decisions.192  Under Nollan , an exaction must be
related by an “essential nexus” to the legitimate state interest it
seeks to advance.193  Under the later Dolan decision, an exaction
must additionally be roughly proportional to the impact caused
by the development.194  Jurisdictions vary in their interpretations
of the scope of Nollan  and Dolan , and for those instances in
which the Nollan/Dolan  principles are found inapplicable, state
and circuit courts have developed differing standards of
scrutiny.195
190 Hammer v. City of Eugene, 202 Or. App. 189, 192, 121 P.3d 693, 695 (2005).
191 Justice Rehnquist’s Penn Central  dissent noted the importance of balancing
the burdens with the advantages created by a new law, a process referred to as “av-
erage reciprocity of advantage.”  In that case, Rehnquist determined that the burden
was impermissibly imposed on a very select group of property owners, while all of
the city benefited.  Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147-
48 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission , 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Court
found that an exaction requiring a public easement across a private owner’s beach
did not share an “essential nexus” with the government’s stated purpose of main-
taining  the public’s “psychological access” to the beach. Id . at 838-39.  In Dolan v.
City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Court required a quantified determination
by the local government that a dedication for a bike path would ease traffic in pro-
portion to the traffic congestion caused by the plaintiff’s commercial development.
Id . at 395-96.
193 Nollan , 483 U.S. at 837.
194 Dolan , 512 U.S. at 395.
195 Questions have arisen whether Nollan  and Dolan  are applicable to non-dedi-
catory conditions on development, since both cases involved physical dedication re-
quirements, and whether the Nollan/Dolan  standards are applicable to legislatively
required exactions, since both cases instead involved site-specific development con-
ditions. See  Miller, supra  note 189, at 480-82. See also , Blue Jean Equities West v.
City and County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); compare
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes Monterey, Ltd., 256 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999)
(characterizing Nollan  and Dolan  as applying to exaction and defining exactions as
“land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of
property to public use”). Other courts, however, hold that the Nollan /Dolan  test
applies to monetary exactions also. See  Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.
1996). See generally  Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1995); Thomas W. Merril, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods , 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
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In a TDR program, receiving sites are restricted to a base ca-
pacity or use, unless TDRs are purchased to exceed those base-
level restrictions.  The purchase of development rights is there-
fore a condition on making the desired use of the land.  This con-
dition seems similar to impact fees,196 and thus may be
considered a monetary exaction.
A majority of courts have held that the Nollan/Dolan  tests do
not apply to monetary exactions.197  By contrast, in Ehrlich v.
Culver City , the Supreme Court of California held that, while
legislatively imposed fees are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan
calculus, non-legislatively imposed fees are.198  Some courts have
begun to follow Ehrlich .199
Oregon courts have ruled that legislatively enacted monetary
exactions are not  subject to heightened scrutiny under Dolan .200
Thus, if the TDR program is legislatively created and uses formu-
las to determine the cost of TDR rights and the limits on their
use, it would presumably qualify as “a generally applicable devel-
opment fee imposed on a broad range of specific, legislatively
determined subcategories of property through a scheme that
leaves no meaningful discretion either in the imposition or in the
calculation of the fee.”201  As such, even among those courts that
196 See  Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 136
(Fla. 2000) (applying the “rational nexus” test to impact fees); see generally  Fred P.
Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Develop-
ment Linkage , 9 NOVA L. REV. 381 (1985).
197 J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Fed-
eral Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here ,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 387 (2002).
198 Ehrlich , 911 P.2d at 433.
199 See, e.g. , Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P., 71 S.W.3d 18, 24
(Tex. App. 2002) (applying Nollan/Dolan  to an exaction requiring improvements to
a public street);  Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d
349, 356 (Ohio 2000) (upholding a roadway exaction); Clark v. City of Albany, 137
Or. App. 293, 299-301, 904 P.2d 185, 189-90 (1995) (applying Dolan  where a permit
was conditioned on a landowner spending money to provide improvements for the
public benefit); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Nollan/Dolan  apply where a city conditions
approval on a developer’s willingness to incur substantial costs improving an adjoin-
ing street), aff’d on other grounds , 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002).
200 Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington County, 181 Or. App. 369, 399-400, 45
P.3d 966, 983 (2002).  The Ninth Circuit has been similarly inclined. See Commercial
Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991) (mone-
tary exaction outside of Nollan  standard); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802,
811 (9th Cir. 1998) (legislative and monetary exactions fall outside Dolan
requirements).
201 Rogers Machinery , 45 P.3d at 983.
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have followed Ehrlich , the program would  not be subject to the
Nollan/Dolan  tests, which are instead aimed at constraining
quasi-judicial determinations of development conditions for indi-
vidual projects.202
In the absence of a clear federal test applicable to legislatively
enacted monetary exactions, Oregon courts have yet to clearly
enunciate a test of their own.  In the recent Homebuilders Asso-
ciation case, the Oregon Court of Appeals noted this deficit and
weighed the parties’ arguments for the “reasonable relationship
test” (enunciated in Ehrlich and the recent San Remo deci-
sion)203 and a more lenient rational basis review.204  The court
found that the exaction in the case passed both tests, and so no
decision was issued as to which standard was the more appropri-
ate.205  In dicta, however, the court seemed to regard rational-
basis review as more appropriate, and noted that a monetary ex-
action logically would fall outside takings doctrine, since paying
compensation for a monetary “taking” would be rather
redundant.206
Additional protection against exactions challenges may be
built into TDR programs by retaining zoning-law provisions al-
lowing variances.  With variance procedures available, paying
TDR fees would not be the only way for developers to get permit
approval.  However, care must be taken to adjust variance stan-
dards when implementing TDR programs to ensure that the
TDR market is not flat-lined by easy, cheap variance availability.
3. Can you Pay to Play?
The reasoning of a 1987 New York decision, Municipal Art So-
ciety v. City of New York , raises a troubling concern.207 There,
202 Homebuilders Ass’n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park and Recreation
Dist., 185 Or. App. 729, 736-37, 62 P.3d 404, 409 (2003).
203 San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105-06 (Cal.
2002).
204 Homebuilders Ass’n , 185 Or. App. at 736-41, 62 P.3d at 409-11.  The reasona-
ble relationship test, as clarified in San Remo , holds that fees must bear a reasonable
relationship, in both amount and intended use, to the “deleterious public impact of
the development.” San Remo , 41 P.3d at 105. The court in Homebuilders Associa-
tion  noted that the San Remo  court seemed to enunciate a standard that would
allow any fee that fell short of “arbitrary and extortionate” to pass muster, bringing
the reasonable relationship test so close to rational review as to escape easy differen-
tiation. Homebuilders Ass’n , 185 Or. App. at 739, 62 P.3d at 410.
205 Id . at 740, 62 P.3d at 411.
206 Id .
207 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
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the court determined that a sale of city property to a private de-
veloper was impermissible because the contract for sale included
a condition effectively increasing the property’s purchase price
by $57 million in the event the developer received a density bo-
nus.208  Although the court found that the standard criteria for
granting the bonus may have been fulfilled, the “government
may not place itself in the position of reaping a cash premium
because one of its agencies bestows a zoning benefit upon a de-
veloper.  Zoning benefits are not cash items.”209  The court spe-
cifically objected to the fact that the transaction’s proceeds were
not applied to improving neighborhood amenities, which would
have reduced the project’s impact on the local community, but
instead went into the general city coffers.210
Applying the New York court’s reasoning to TDR programs, it
would be important to avoid making TDRs a proxy for crude
government kickbacks by connecting fees paid for TDRs to the
conferral of a public benefit.  If TDRs are purchased on the pub-
lic market, Municipal Art Society  would not be implicated be-
cause it would be the sending-site owner, not the government,
receiving profit from the sale.  If purchases are instead made
from a TDR bank, this concern might be addressed, among other
ways, by using the funds to further the TDR program, purchase
TDRs from sending sites, and make outright purchases of ease-
ments and dedications.  The permissibility of assessments of this
type in the case of TDR purchases is not yet clear. In the case of
similar assessments, such as impact fees, permissibility seems to
stem in large part from the benefits they confer in relation to the
burdens caused by the development.211
C. Other Concerns Regarding TDR Programs
1. Antitrust Issues
When crafting a TDR program, care must be taken to avoid
antitrust issues.212  These issues may arise where the government
controls too many elements of the market (such as price-setting
for TDRs) and assumes a role as sole purchaser or seller of
208 Id . at 800-01.
209 Id . at 804.
210 Id . at 803-04.
211 Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling
Legislation , 25 URB. LAW. 491, 492-95 (1993).
212 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1362-63.
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TDRs, without room for interaction of private participants.213
Although states are exempted from antitrust liability by the
“state actor” doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court in Parker
v. Brown ,214 local governments are not always immune.  First,
the state actor doctrine extends to local governments only when
a municipality’s restriction of competition is an “authorized im-
plementation” of clearly articulated state policy.215  Second, even
this inherited immunity may be abrogated if the locality enjoys
broad home-rule authorization.216  Finally, although local gov-
ernments enjoy statutory protection from damages liability under
the Clayton Antitrust Act,217 they may be subject to injunctions
under section 26 of that Act.218
Thus, because local governments may be vulnerable to anti-
trust claims, they must structure TDR programs so as to avoid
them.  A primary strategy for avoiding antitrust problems is to
ensure that private sales are allowed.219
2. Supply/Demand Problems
TDR programs are vulnerable to supply and demand failures
for many reasons.  A major one is public distrust of government.
Unfortunately, current controversies over land-use issues tend to
render suspect any government efforts to address those issues.
Therefore, because the success of the TDR program depends on
the trust that both buyers and sellers have in the system, it is
crucial that the program be thoroughly publicized and explained,
and public concerns addressed, before actual implementation
begins.220
Next, program planners must address supply-side issues to en-
sure that sufficient sending sites are available to serve as TDR
“stockyards” for the program, which in many instances may last
into the foreseeable future.221  Planners must carefully calculate
213 Id .; see also  Cmty. Commc’n Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Town of Hal-
lie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260
(1986); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) (repre-
senting the primary cases in municipal antitrust law).
214 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
215 Omni Outdoor , 499 U.S. at 370.
216 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1364.
217 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (2006).
218 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (2006).
219 Stevenson, supra  note 143, at 1365.
220 See PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 120-23.
221 Id. at 130-31.
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the number and type of TDRs produced by sending sites and
match them with the calculated demand to be created by desig-
nated receiving sites.222  Such calculations will include adjust-
ments to both (1) the quantity of qualifying sending and
receiving sites, and (2) the quantity and type of TDRs available
to each site.223  Consultations between the relevant government
body and land economists are essential.
In addition, governments considering TDR programs must
consider the effect that other provisions of local land-use law will
have on TDR supply and demand.  Demand for TDRs suffers if
zoning regulations are so lenient, or development so slow, that
developers are not interested in paying for additional capacity.224
As previously discussed, TDR values may suffer from adminis-
trative undercutting when variance standards are set too loosely,
or when other (free) development bonuses are plentiful.225  For
example, Portland’s Johnson Creek Basin District allows both
density bonuses and TDRs, and the success of that TDR pro-
gram may be suffering as a result.226
3. Pricing the Commodity
Maintaining fair prices for TDRs is crucial to program success
because it ensures steady demand for the commodity and helps
avoid takings challenges.227  If regulations do create a taking,
compensation, whether in the form of TDRs or money, will be
legally required; thus, a TDR pricing mechanism is needed.  In
Lucas -type takings (where all economic value has been taken),
finding a price is relatively easy—plaintiffs are entitled to fair
market value based on either their purchase price or the market
price of similarly situated parcels.228  By contrast, pricing is more
difficult in cases where regulation simply creates incremental
losses in value.  But the task is nonetheless necessary if a market
is going to exist; at least one court has held that mere conference
of TDRs without a guaranteed market “fails to assure preserva-
222 Id.
223 Id . at 63-72, 131.
224 Id.  at 70-72.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 314-15.
227 See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-50 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
228 See generally  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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tion of the very real economic value of the development rights as
they existed when still attached to the underlying property.”229
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the
issue of TDR valuation, at least two cases indicate that it will pay
special attention to valuation issues when it considers the legiti-
macy of TDR programs.  As discussed above, the Court’s deci-
sions in Suitum  and Penn Central  illustrate that TDR valuation
will be important in deciding (1) whether sufficient compensation
has been given for a taking (if TDRs are counted as compensa-
tion), or (2) whether a taking has occurred in the first instance (if
TDRs are counted as residual value).230
TDR banks are the most obvious way to provide the logistical
and price support required to guarantee value.  If a taking has
not occurred, a decision must nevertheless be made as to
whether TDRs will be calculated to offer full—or something less
than full—compensation for the value lost as a result of a partic-
ular regulation.
V
POSSIBLE MODELS: CENTRALIZATION
OR DECENTRALIZATION?
Setting aside the question of the shape a detailed TDR scheme
in Oregon might take (i.e., land banks, density bonuses, valua-
tion, etc.), one must consider what level of government (or com-
bination of levels of government) would be responsible for
administering the program.  There are three possible paradigms:
(1) a state-level TDR program implemented by an agency; (2) a
specific state delegation to localities (whether counties or munici-
palities); or (3) a state-authorized program managed according to
some type of cooperative regional arrangement between
localities.
Each paradigm represents a particular attitude toward the ap-
propriate level at which to lodge power.  While Oregon is not a
Dillon’s Rule state231 with complete legislative supremacy over
localities, Oregon is also not a state that grants localities strong
home-rule autonomy, particularly after the 1978 City of La
229 Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.E.2d 381, 388 (N.Y.
1976).
230 See supra  Part IV.A.
231 Home Rule in Oregon Cities: A 20th Century Odyssey , The City Ctr. at the
League of Oregon Cities, Dec. 2001, at 7.
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Grande  case.232  However, Oregon is a state that has at moments
in its past been willing to experiment in its local-government law.
For example, the 1973 comprehensive state land-use scheme es-
tablished pursuant to Senate Bill 100 created a state agency, the
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), to
promulgate statewide land-use goals.233  The LCDC scheme was
an interesting blend of top-down and bottom-up land-use plan-
ning: localities were able to craft their own land-use rules as long
as they could be squared with the overarching LCDC goals.234
A second state experiment has been the establishment and
growth of Portland Metro, a regional entity encompassing three
counties and over twenty cities with a grant of home-rule author-
ity from the State and a specific set of cross-jurisdictional pow-
ers.235  Metro was, to a certain extent, an admittedly top-down
imposition by the Legislature on the cities and counties involved.
However, to the extent that Metro’s structure allows localities to
retain a say in Metro governance and significant exclusive juris-
diction over certain matters, Metro’s regional coordination has
not fomented the level of opposition and resistance from local
governments that might otherwise occur.236
If the Oregon Legislature were to consider a TDR component
as part of its pending “Big Look” at land-use planning, what
forms might such a component take?
232 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204
(1978).
233 Dept. of Land Conservation and Dev., Statewide Planning Goals, http://
www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2006); see  Aoki, supra
note 10, at 426-27.
234 The 1973 passage of Senate Bill 100 created the LCDC to adopt statewide
goals that serve as guidelines for local government in implementing comprehensive
plans consistent with the statewide goals. See  Statewide Planning Goals, supra  note
233.
235 Metro Charter (text), available at  http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?Ar-
ticleID=629; see also  Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philoso-
phy: Oregon’s Home Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism , 76
OR. L. REV. 909 (1997).
236 See  Aoki, supra  note 10, at 427-30 (discussing the formation of Metro). But
see  City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or. App. 481, 488-94, 115 P.3d 960, 964-67 (2005)
(pitting local governments against Metro for a determination of where Metro’s
power ends and the power of local governments begins). For an exemplification of
the opposition to land-use planning, see also groups and think-tanks opposed to
land-use planning such as Oregonians In Action, http://www.oia.org/, The Thoreau
Institute, http://www.ti.org/ and The Reason Foundation, http://www.reason.org/
growth.
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A. Statewide TDR Control
In a statewide TDR scheme, administration would be lodged
at the state level by creation of a TDR Commission or other sim-
ilar entity.237  Such a commission would be empowered to desig-
nate sending and receiving sites, craft eligibility standards for
creation and transfer of TDRs, and possibly administer a state-
wide TDR bank.238
Advantages to such a statewide entity include: the alleviation
of inconsistent and idiosyncratic implementation of localized
TDR schemes; the allowance of increased deliberation facilitated
by insulation from local political pressures; better decision-mak-
ing; and a reduction of inefficient duplicative efforts spurred by
the achievement of economies of scale.239
Still, such a statewide scheme might involve many problems.
For instance, administrative ignorance of local land-use practices
and needs might create substantial difficulties, especially consid-
ering Oregon’s diverse geography (mountains, high deserts, river
valleys, farm and ranching land, the coastal region, and densely
populated urban areas).  This diversity could yield very real dif-
ferences and incommensurabilities in the types of sending and
receiving sites needed as well as in the supply of and demand for
different types of TDRs, thus hindering the formation of a coher-
ent statewide TDR market.
The question of political accountability dogs statewide agen-
cies in Oregon,240 particularly given the geographical and politi-
237 Former State Representative and current State Senator Kurt Schrader intro-
duced a TDR bill in the Oregon House (HB 3998, 71st Or. Legis. Ass’y (2001)) in
response to Measure 7.  More recently, in February 2005, Schrader introduced Sen-
ate Bill 406 as a potential solution to the Measure 37 debate. S.B. 406 73rd Or. Legis.
Ass’y (2005). While neither passed, Schrader’s bills could provide guidance in imple-
menting a statewide TDR program.
238 Precedent for such an entity can be found in the LCDC. See supra  text accom-
panying notes 233-234. The LCDC promulgates statewide goals or the rules associ-
ated with statewide land-use guidelines. See  Dept. of Land Conservation and Dev.,
supra  note 233 (explaining the history of and laying out Oregon’s nineteen statewide
land-use goals).
239 See GERALD E. FRUG ET AL. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 1-17 (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing the tension between Alexis de Tocqueville’s decentralized government
and centralized government as espoused by James Madison in The Federalist Num-
ber 10).
240 This is a foundational problem of administrative law generally. See generally
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law , 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276 (1984); see also  David B. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure
Act:  An Essay on State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform , 58 OR. L.
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cal diversity of the state.241  For example, residents’ needs
regarding preservation of agricultural lands may be very different
in the Willamette Valley than in eastern Oregon.  A statewide
TDR agency drawing personnel largely from the Willamette Val-
ley might have difficulty making representative decisions with re-
spect to resource needs and property values in other areas of
Oregon.
Finally, theoretical efficiencies of scale might not actually
translate into efficient implementation of TDR plans.  Bureau-
cratic delay and mission drift may be more likely at the statewide
level than at the local level.242  Furthermore, it might be madden-
ingly unclear how and to what extent statewide rules implement-
ing a TDR scheme would preempt local land-use powers, and to
what extent localities might enjoy autonomy from state preemp-
tion by asserting that such land-use rules affect purely local
matters.243
REV. 411, 449-50 (1980) (noting that the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act con-
tains several provisions that attempt to hold agencies accountable to the electorate
by front-loading notice requirements).
241 This issue has been raised repeatedly in respect to Oregon judicial elections
because of overwhelming demographic representation of judges from the Willam-
ette Valley to the exclusion of judges from southern or eastern Oregon. See BILL
BRADBURY, OREGON BLUE BOOK 2005-2006, at 302 (2005) (noting that in Measure
22, which failed by approximately 14,000 votes on the November 2002 ballot, would
have amended the Oregon Constitution to require Oregon appellate judges to be
elected by district).
242 See supra  note 238 (discussing the bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in large
administrative agencies).
243 There are four primary ways to determine what is purely local. First, the cate-
gorical approach, advocated by John Stuart Mill, argues that governmental functions
should be split in two, allocating those functions “best served” centrally to the cen-
tral government and those best served locally to the local government.  Mill felt that
issues could be categorized as “purely local matters” or “matters of statewide and
national concern.”  John Stuart Mill , On Representative Government , in FRUG ET
AL. supra  note 239, at 171, 171-77.
The question remains how you determine which is which: how do you find a zone
of local autonomy in a system that is heavily skewed toward centralized govern-
ment?  In City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Board , 281 Or. 137,
576. P.2d 1204 (1978), Justice Hans Linde, writing for a majority of the Oregon Su-
preme Court, held that home rule only grants control over local-government organi-
zation and procedures. Article XI of the Oregon Constitution was only intended to
allow local governments to determine their own organizational structures without
requiring legislative approval.  This represents the “legislative supremacy” approach,
which holds that centralized government is more equipped to determine proper gov-
ernance. By contrast, Justice Tongue’s dissent in La Grande  states that:
the ‘home rule’ amendments to the Oregon Constitution granted to Ore-
gon cities exclusive power to legislate as to all matters of ‘local interest’ i.e.,
a grant of ‘local autonomy,’ free from intervention by the state legislature,
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Thus, technical and administrative hurdles may present serious
roadblocks to statewide application.  A statewide market would
mean heightened complexity, and differences in local geography
and development needs would make setting universal standards
for availability and variety of TDRs an administrative
nightmare.244  Nevertheless, state-created programs have proven
to be workable when limited in scope.  For example, New
Jersey’s Pinelands project is state-created and administered, but
covers only a relatively small geographic region.245
At the very least, a centralized statewide TDR scheme would
leave some notable gaps to fill and questions to confront.  How
might a decentralized model that locates more power in localities
compare?
B. Local TDR Control
In place of a statewide plan, Oregon could consider a TDR
scheme in which local governments implement their own pro-
grams.246  In contrast to the State, which enjoys plenary author-
ity, local governments must identify some specific provision of
state law that authorizes local creation of programs with TDR
features.247  There are two methods by which local governments
and with the courts as the arbiters of disputes between cities and the state
as to what are matters of ‘local interest.’
Id. at 157, 576 P.2d at 1216-17.  Justice Tongue advocates for the “balancing ap-
proach” that Oregon followed prior to the La Grande  decision.
Finally, in Johnson v. Bradley , 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992), the California Supreme
Court adopted the “matters of statewide concern” approach, stating, “When the lo-
cal matter under review ‘implicates a “municipal affair”’ and poses a genuine con-
flict with state law, the question of statewide concern is the bedrock inquiry through
which the conflict between state and local interests is adjusted.” Id. at 996.
244 The reality is that Oregon’s varying geography and population density would
hinder a statewide TDR scheme.
Given Oregon’s extremely diverse geology, it is surprising that most peo-
ple, including Oregonians, accept the generalization that Oregon is best
divided into two geographic regions: the western coast and valleys, and the
eastern and central high deserts. In fact, the state, especially its eastern
section, is much more subtle.
BILL MCRAE ET AL., LONELY PLANET, PACIFIC NORTHWEST: OREGON & WASHING-
TON 125 (2d ed. 1999).
245 See PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 215-21 (describing the Pinelands TDR
program).
246 See  John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environ-
mental Law , 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2002).
247 Id.  at 377.
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might come by such authority: by presumption of home-rule
power or by express legislative enabling act.
1. Plans Based on “Home Rule” Power
The Oregon Constitution’s home-rule provision provides that
the “legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted
power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the
Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon.”248  State
courts consistently have upheld the validity of local enactments
under this provision except where local regulations conflict with
state statutory or constitutional law, or where state preemption
clearly is intended.249  Additionally, the Oregon Supreme Court
has established a presumption in civil matters that preemption is
not  intended,250  although the home-rule provision is subject to
certain judicially imposed limitations under City of La
Grande .251
The City of Portland has created a home-rule TDR program in
an urban context.  The Portland Program utilizes three major
sending-site areas: (1) the Skyline District is designated to pre-
serve open space and agriculture; (2) the Johnson Creek Basin is
designated to preserve open space and protect sensitive environ-
mental areas (including Johnson Creek itself and the Boring
Lava Domes); and (3) sites in the Central City District are desig-
nated to preserve low-income housing, open space, and historic
buildings.252
248 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1859, amended 1910).
249 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 148-49, 576 P.2d
1204, 1211 (1978); Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or. App. 624, 634-
35, 4 P.3d 748, 757 (2000).
250 See La Grande, 281 Or. 137 at 148-49, 576 P.2d at 1211.
251 The City of La Grande decision established that Oregon’s home-rule provision
only protects local governments from preemption in the case of conflict with state
law when local decisions are related to the “structure” of local government. La
Grande , 281 Or. at 156-57, 576 P.2d at 1215.
252 PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 314.  Portland’s city code provides for TDRs in
Commercial zones at PORTLAND, OR. ZONING CODE § 33.130.205(C)(2006), Em-
ployment/Industrial Zones at PORTLAND, OR. ZONING CODE § 33.140.205(C)
(2006), as a preservation incentive for historic property in PORTLAND, OR. ZONING
CODE § 33.445.610 (2006), and in the central city master plan at PORTLAND, OR.
ZONING CODE § 33.510.255 (2006). Despite these provisions, Portland’s TDR pro-
grams have not been overly utilized.  In fact, Portland serves as an excellent example
of the importance of a market in TDR programs.  Interviews with several land-use
attorneys and a planner in Portland revealed that the Portland TDR program’s pri-
mary challenges come from the general upzoning of downtown Portland and the
ability of developers to get density bonuses by engaging in desired development.
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But the home-rule model of TDRs carries inherent drawbacks,
most notably statewide inconsistency and inefficiency.253  Such
problems give rise to the argument that TDR programs do not
address “local” problems at all, but are better conceived as a
statewide solution for a statewide problem.254  In some ways, al-
though not in the specific context of a TDR program, events oc-
curring between the passage of Measure 37 in November 2004
and the lower court’s MacPherson255 decision in October 2005
illustrate the potential pitfalls of a locality-by-locality approach.
In implementing Measure 37, some local governments decided to
deter claim filings with high filing fees,256 while others were in-
clined to avoid paying claims by granting blanket waivers.257
Moreover, there was no standardized statewide procedure for
making property valuations associated with Measure 37 claims.
And because there was no standardized Measure 37 procedure,
advising landowners on how to make Measure 37 claims became
a cottage industry virtually overnight.258
Telephone Interview with Ty K. Wyman, Of Counsel, Dunn, Carney, Allen, Higgens
& Tongue LLP, in Portland, Or. (Jan. 4, 2006); Telephone Interview with Mark D.
Whitlow, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP, in Portland, Or. (Jan. 4, 2006); Telephone In-
terview with Nicholas T. Starin, City Planner, City of Portland (Jan. 6, 2006).
253 Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II – Localism and Legal Theory , 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 447-49 (1990); see generally  David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule , 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003) (discussing the strengths and weak-
nesses of home rule).
254 See supra  note 241 (discussing the four primary ways to determine what is a
purely local matter).
255 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., Civil No. 05-C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion
County, Or. Oct. 14, 2005) available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/
Measure37_000.pdf.
256 See  Schellene Clendenin, Unusual M-37 Proposals , NEWBERG GRAPHIC
(Newberg, Or.), Mar. 9, 2005, available at  http://www.newberggraphic.com /news/
archive/3-9-05/index.htm (noting Multnomah County’s $12,500 filing fee for Mea-
sure 37 claims).
257 See  David Bates, County 1st in State to OK Claims , NEWS-REGISTER
(McMinnville, Or.), Feb. 3, 2005, available at  http://www.newsregister.com/news/re-
sults.cfm?story_no=189907 (discussing Yamhill County granting waivers for Mea-
sure 37 claims). But see  Marian Hammond, Governor Press Release , Dec. 1, 2004,
available at  http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/p2004/press_120104a.shtml (calling on
“all state and local regulatory entities to refrain from immediate responses and blan-
ket waivers until we can ensure a sound and fair process that meets the needs of all
parties.”). See also  Keith Chu, Jefferson Cty. Issues Measure 37 Waivers , BEND BUL-
LETIN, Apr. 28, 2005, at A1; Sinks, supra  note 7; Lily Raff, Deschutes County OKs
M37 Claims , BEND BULLETIN, May 12, 2005 at C1.
258 Examples of this cottage industry can be seen in the proliferation of materials
and workshops. See, e.g. , Moshofsky, supra  note 14; OREGONIANS IN ACTION EDU-
CATION CENTER 2006 LAND USE FORUM, available at http://oia.org/LookingFor-
wardJan-Feb06.pdf; Measure 37 Summit, Oregon Law Institute in cooperation with
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2. Legislatively Authorized Plans
Alternatively, local governments would not have to construct
TDR programs using a home-rule framework if the Oregon Leg-
islature were to grant them specific power to create and manage
TDRs within their respective jurisdictions.259  The Oregon Legis-
lature has some limited experience with such proposals. In 2002,
Deschutes County implemented a legislatively authorized TDR
system in which the County granted TDRs to property owners
who were denied building permits because they lacked adequate
sewer hookups.260  These TDRs were transferable to receiving-
site owners with property adjacent to a sewer hookup.261  Addi-
tionally, former State Representative and current State Senator
Kurt Schrader has introduced two—ultimately unsuccessful—
bills in the past five years that would have created additional en-
abling legislation for local TDR programs.262
Under a legislative-authorization model, local governments
could implement individual TDR schemes within broad state-
wide parameters (reminiscent of the LCDC and its nineteen
planning goals).263  The upside is that the State could maintain
some measure of efficiency and consistency, while presumably
leaving localities free to tailor TDR schemes to their individual
needs.  Clearly, the considerations affecting land use in Eastern
Oregon are different from those in the Springfield/Eugene area,
on the Oregon Coast, or in the greater Portland area; however,
all of those areas might benefit from some measure of
uniformity.
Miller Nash LLP, held Jan. 5, 2005, brochure and registration information, available
at  http://www.lclark.edu/org/oli/objects/ Measure37.pdf (providing examples of some
ways the groups are able to profit from the confusion created by Measure 37).
259 If the Legislature (or voters through the initiative process) were to grant such
powers explicitly, whether or not those powers fit within the court’s interpretation of
the home-rule provision, OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1859, amended 1910), would not
matter. See  La Grande/Astoria v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d
1204 (1978).
260 See  Deschutes County Community Development Department, Overview of
the TDC Program , available at  http://www.co.deschutes.or.us/go/objectid/A8E466
89-BDBD-57C1-9E845D6E27D06ED7/index.cfm (providing a history and overview
of the creation of the Deschutes County Transfer Development Credit Program);
See also DESCHUTES COUNTY, OR., CODE ch. 11.12 (2004).
261 See DESCHUTES COUNTY, OR., CODE ch. 11.12 (2004).
262 H.B. 3998, 71st Or. Legis. Ass’y (2001); S.B. 406, 73rd Or. Legis. Ass’y (2005).
263 See  Dept. of Land Conservation and Dev., supra  note 233. The creation of the
LCDC and the implementation of the nineteen goals resulted from the 1973 passage
of Senate Bill 100. See Aoki, supra  note 10, at 426-27.
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3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Local Control
In the end, both forms of localized TDR programs, home-rule
and legislatively authorized, may possess the usual benefits and
drawbacks of localized control.  Theoretically, such programs of-
fer superior political accountability because local officials will be
interested in pleasing their constituents.  However, this could cut
both ways, as local officials might be more susceptible to “cap-
ture” by developers and other wealthy factions, who may en-
deavor to gut TDR schemes or turn them to their unfair
advantage.264
Localized TDR models may also suffer from interlocal compe-
tition.  Since these models are premised on the autonomy and
independence of each local government, there is the ubiquitous
“prisoner’s dilemma,” wherein localities, acting in their own per-
ceived (and narrow) self-interests, implement TDR schemes that
advantage them and disadvantage their neighbors.265  The result
is an undesirable “race to the bottom” between neighboring local
governments.
If both centralized TDR schemes and devolved approaches
present serious problems, what other approaches might be worth
pursuing?
C. Regional TDR Control
One possible way to avoid the problems inherent to central-
ized and devolved approaches to TDRs involves the legislative
creation of regional TDR authorities.266  In a state such as Ore-
gon with several geographically distinct regions, regional TDR
entities might make sense.  The TDR market and goals of an
area such as the Willamette Valley—which seeks balance among
industrial development, agriculture, and residential uses—will
normally differ from those of sparsely settled areas such as south-
eastern Oregon or the southern Oregon coast.  Regional TDR
entities could take cognizance of such differences and tailor their
264 See  Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law? , 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 995-98
(1991) (discussing the impact of one-sided lobbying on state and local
representatives).
265 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (providing an introduction of the
prisoner’s dilemma to public goods).
266 See generally  Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The
Need for Regional Governments , 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2001).
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TDR systems to idiosyncratic local contexts, local markets, and
local goals for sending and receiving sites.267  Furthermore, a re-
gional body would help ensure some cooperation among commu-
nities, facilitating a coordination of efforts often unavailable in a
purely localized scheme.268
Both the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)269 and the
Portland Metro Council270 are regional bodies possessing ele-
ments that may serve as helpful models for a regional TDR pro-
gram.271  The origins and structure of the TRPA were aptly
described by Justice Sullivan of the California Supreme Court in
1971:
Today, and for the foreseeable future, the ecology of Lake
Tahoe stands in grave danger before a mounting wave of pop-
ulation and development.
In an imaginative and commendable effort to avert this im-
minent threat, California and Nevada, with the approval of
Congress, entered into the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact
. . . . The basic concept of the Compact is a simple one—to
provide for the region as a whole the planning, conservation
and resource development essential to accommodate a grow-
ing population within the region’s relatively small area without
destroying the environment.
To achieve this purpose, the Compact establishes the
[TRPA] with jurisdiction over the entire region. The Agency
267 See FRUG ET AL., supra  note 239, at 486-90 (excerpting AMERICAN PLANNING
ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR
PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (phases I and II interim ed., 1998)).
See also id . at 525-33 (excerpting Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and
Suburbs Talk to Each Other – and Often Agree , 8 HOUS. POL. DEBATE 12 (1997)).
268 See  Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism , 48 BUFF. LAW REV. 1, 23
(2000).  Briffault posits that current fragmentation of metropolitan areas prevents
local communities from realizing the extent of their common interests.  Regional
entities “would be not simply a means of allowing the regional community to control
its collective fate, but also a means of bringing the regional community into being.”
Id . See also  Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization , 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993)
(arguing for expanding consciousness of regional responsibilities and solidarity).
269 See  Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360
(1969); see also  People ex rel . Younger v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d 1193, 1195-
99 (Cal. 1971) (providing a detailed description of the formation and structure of the
TRPA).
270 See  Aoki, supra  note 10, at 425-34 (offering a detailed discussion of Portland
Metro’s structure and formation).
271 The New Jersey Pinelands and Long Island Pine Barrens programs provide
further examples of regional programs introduced at the state level. PRUETZ, supra
note 120, at 215-21, 193-96.
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has been given broad powers to make and enforce a regional
plan of an unusually comprehensive scope.272
However, despite its establishment as a regional land-use au-
thority, many aspects of the TRPA are not on point with respect
to state TDR programs.  First, the TRPA is the product of a fed-
erally ratified intersovereign agreement between California and
Nevada.273  Moreover, local governments in the region unsuc-
cessfully sued the TRPA for heavy-handed interference with zon-
ing decisions that the localities felt were within their purview.274
Still, there is merit in the idea that, where localities have been
unable to agree, a legislature should take the initiative and create
an entity addressing a pressing regional problem.
The Portland Metro Council provides a second model for re-
gional TDR programs.  As previously discussed, the Metro is a
state-created regional entity encompassing multiple Oregon
counties and cities.  Metro was legislatively imposed, but locali-
ties retain a say in Metro governance and significant exclusive
jurisdiction over certain matters.275
Thus, the Metro model may provide affected localities more
governing voice in the regional body than the TRPA model.  Ad-
ditionally, Metro’s elected-council feature would partially ad-
dress the democratic-deficit problem of appointed agencies
discussed above.276  If such a democratic model were followed,
the question would then become one of the makeup of the re-
gional TDR body: would it be “one government, one vote” or
“one person, one vote”?  Clearly, regions made up of many
272 Younger , 487 P.2d at 1195-96 (internal citation omitted); see also  Tahoe Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308-09 (2002)
(internal citations omitted):
In the 1960’s, when the problems associated with . . . burgeoning develop-
ment began to receive significant attention, jurisdiction over the [Tahoe]
Basin, which occupies 501 square miles, was shared by the States of Cali-
fornia and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities, and the Forest Ser-
vice of the Federal Government. In 1968, the legislatures of the two States
adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact . . . . The compact set goals
for the protection and preservation of the lake and created TRPA as the
agency assigned “to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and
to conserve its natural resources.”
273 Younger , 487 P.2d at 1195-96.
274 See id.  at 508. See also  City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or. App. 481, 115 P.3d 960
(2005) (exemplifying the same principle in Oregon).
275 See supra introduction to Part V.
276 See supra  note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent problem of
political accountability in administrative agencies).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 55 28-JUN-06 12:09
Trading Spaces:  Measure 37 327
smaller local governments would prefer the “one government,
one vote” model, whereas cities like Portland, Bend, Medford
and Eugene/Springfield would prefer “one person, one vote” be-
cause their large populations would translate into a greater rep-
resentative share in the entity’s governance.
Regional TDR programs would, of course, come with
problems of their own.  For instance, inconsistencies across geo-
graphic regions inevitably would exist (although they might not
match the discord that would occur between inconsistent local-
government schemes). Moreover, political accountability likely
would be more attenuated in a regional program than in a purely
localized program, particularly if a “one government, one vote”
model were followed.  Another downside might be general pub-
lic hostility to adding yet another layer of government bureau-
cracy, a move that would almost surely run contrary to many
Oregonians’ preexisting libertarian bias against big government.
There is one other option for regional TDR programs.  While
the previous discussion of localized TDR programs describes de-
centralized power giving rise to interlocal competition, inconsis-
tent results, and a “race to the bottom,” there is another
possibility.  What if genuinely empowered local governments in-
stead chose to cooperate—to work together to solve the cross-
jurisdictional problems that land-use laws address?  Properly
conceived, local governments could be the motivating force be-
hind the creation of regional TDR entities via interlocal agree-
ments, thus dispensing with the need for a top-down program
legislatively imposed by the State.  Just such an agreement has
been created in Boulder County, Colorado.277  In fact, since the
mid-1990s, several cities, counties, and unincorporated communi-
ties have entered into agreements with one another allowing the
creation of TDRs on sending sites where owners agree to a pres-
ervation easement on qualifying Planned Unit Developments.278
In conclusion, this section has reviewed three ways of imple-
menting a TDR scheme in Oregon: (1) a statewide TDR agency;
(2) a devolved and diverse variety of TDR schemes promulgated
by Oregon localities; and (3) regional TDR entities created to
respect the different geographic and environmental needs and as-
pects of Oregon’s regions.  This latter type of entity could be cre-
277 See PRUETZ, supra  note 120, at 171-74 (discussing the TDR program imple-
mented in Boulder, CO).
278 See id.  at 171.
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ated either by legislative fiat or by empowered localities working
cooperatively with one another.
CONCLUSION
TDR programs have much to offer Oregon and other states
experiencing the ever-escalating crunch between the need for de-
velopment and the need to ensure that development is desirable.
They offer a chance for government to address the private costs
created by changing regulations without crippling state and local
economies and overall quality of life in the name of private prop-
erty rights.  As a relative newcomer to the field in the United
States, the TDR concept does not fit clearly into the pre-formed
niches of our land-use jurisprudence.  Some questions remain re-
garding the status of TDR programs in takings, exactions, and
other important fields of law; those questions persist even among
those who have made studied efforts to fit the programs within
those niches.  Nevertheless, the popularity of successful TDR
programs shows that they are exceptionally useful when well
applied.
